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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2(a)3(2) (h) as this is an appeal from a final judgment and
order in a domestic relations action.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Appellant contends that the Trial Court has

misunderstood or misapplied the law in determining that
there had been a substantial and material change in
circumstances

concerning

child

support.

In reality,

Appellant is attacking the Court's Findings of Fact. As
such, the Appellant has applied the wrong standard of
review and has failed to marshal all of the evidence and,
despite such evidence, demonstrate that the Findings of
Fact were clearly erroneous. Therefore the Appellate
Court should affirm the Trial Court's child support
award.
2.

The Trial Court did not error in determining

that there had been a substantial and material change in
circumstances with respect to Appellantfs ability to
provide support for her minor children.
3.
material

After
change

determining
in

that

circumstances

a

substantial

had

occurred

and
with

respect to the child support award, the Trial Court did
not error in applying the presumptive child support
guidelines in Section 78-45-1, et. seq. U.C.A.

1

4.

After setting a presumptive amount of child

support pursuant to the statute, the Trial Court did not
error in requiring that Appellant rebut the presumption.
5.

After

receiving

Appellant's

evidence

in

rebuttal to the child support guidelines, the Court
evaluated each of the factors contained in Section 78-457(3), U.C.A., and granted some reduction in the child
support to accommodate Appellant's expenses.
6.

The

Modification

Court's

review

of

child

support was not bound to the language utilized by the
Divorce Court's child support award but rather, the
Modification Court was free to conduct an entire review
of child support once it had determined that there had
been a substantial and material change of circumstances
with respect to said child support award since the entry
of the Decree of Divorce.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As more fully discussed in Point I of the Argument,
the sound discretion of the Trial Court in establishing
a child support award will not be overturned unless the
Trial Court's Findings are clearly erroneous or are a
clear abuse of discretion. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; also see authorities cited in Point I of
this brief.
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Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness and
are

given

no

special

deference

on

appeal. Also

see

authorities cited in Point I of this brief.
RECORD ON APPEAL
References to the Trial Transcript will be made as
follows:

(TT

). Such

reference

will

be

utilized

because the District Court Clerk did not paginate the
Trial Transcript. References to the Findings of Fact
entered by the Trial Court at the time of the divorce
will be made as follows: (DFF

). References to the

Trial Court's Findings of Fact during the Petition for
Modification proceeding will be made as follows: (MFF
).

Addenda

in

follows: (ADD

the

brief

will

be

referred

to

as

).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE CASELAW
Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Ann.:
Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Annotated provides for
continuing

jurisdiction

in

the

Trial

Court

to

make

subsequent changes or new orders after the entry of the
Decree of Divorce.
Section

78-45-1

et. seq.r

U.C.A.,

The Uniform

Civil

Liability for Support Act, Specifically:
Section 78-45-7(3), which designates factors to be
utilized in the event that the Court determines that
there is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptive
child support established by the statute.
3

Section 78-45-7.2, U.C.A. which sets presumptive
child support guidelines and makes same applicable to all
orders establishing or modifying child support after July
1, 1989.
Caselaw:
Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993),
interprets the presumptive child support guidelines and
explains the methodology for applying same.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from an order modifying a
Decree of Divorce previously entered by the Seventh
Judicial District Court in and for Carbon County, State
of Utah. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce in the original divorce proceeding were
entered on January 18, 1991. An Amended Decree of Divorce
Nunc Pro Tunc was subsequently entered on February 4,
1992. The Amended Decree is not of significance in this
action. (All documents from original action are included
as ADD A ) .
Plaintiff/Appellee filed the current Petition for
Modification on February 10, 1994 alleging a substantial
and material change in circumstance concerning the issues
relevant to a child support modification (ROA 146). The
Petition for Modification was tried before the Honorable
Bryce K. Bryner on August 26, 1994. After receiving sworn
testimony and exhibits on behalf of each of the parties
4

and entering some Findings of Fact and Rulings in Open
Court, the Court took the matter under advisement and
entered its Memorandum Decision on August 29, 1994.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Order
Modifying the Decree of Divorce were signed and entered
on November 4, 1994 (ADD B ) . Defendant/Appellant filed
Notice of Appeal on November 23, 1994 (ROA 211).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee offers the following statement of relevant
facts in the present case:
1.

The Plaintiff/Appellee (hereinafter referred to

as "David") and the Defendant/Appellant

(hereinafter

referred to as "Gloria") were divorced by Decree entered
by the above-entitled Court on January 18, 1991.
2.

The Decree

of

Divorce

and Amended

Decree

awarded David the sole legal care and custody of his
three (3) minor children, namely, Amanda Ashley Hight,
born October 25, 1985; Adam Parker Hight, born June 5,
1987 and Shawn David Hight, also born June 5, 1987.
3.

The Decree of Divorce did not reguire Gloria to

pay child support to David for various reasons which were
outlined in specific Findings of Fact entered by the
Divorce Court. All of the applicable Findings of Fact are
as follows:

5

Findings of Fact from divorce:
DFF5

The Court finds that the Defendant earned
a gross income of $8,963.00 to the first
part of October, 1990 from her part-time
employment with the United States Postal
Department and, therefore, the Court
finds that her average gross income is
the sum of $990.00 per month for the year
1990.

DFF6

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is
currently employed
at Sears as a
repairman
and
earns
approximately
$2,400.00 per month from said employment.

DFF9

The Court will not require the Defendant
to pay child support to the Plaintiff to
assist with the support of the children
at this time because the Defendant will
need all of her available income to take
care of her living expenses as well as
meet
payments
on
the
large
debt
obligations which she owes for her
medical treatment and expenses. [Emphasis
added].

DFF10

Based on the Plaintiff's present income
and his obligation to solely support his
children because of the Defendant's
current limited earning capacity and debt
level and because of the Court's order
requiring the Plaintiff to contribute to
the payment of medical debts for the
benefit of the Defendant, the Court will
not order the Plaintiff to pay the
Defendant any alimony. [Emphasis added].

DFF11

The Plaintiff is further ordered to pay
one-half of all of the outstanding
medical bills incurred by the Defendant
as shown on her Financial Declaration.
The Defendant is also ordered to pay onehalf of all of the outstanding medical
bills incurred by her as designated in
her Financial Declaration. [Irrelevant
portions of FF11 have been deleted] .
[Medical bills outlined on Defendant's
Financial Declaration totaled $17,805.90;
See ADD F ) .
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DFF12

4.

Each of the parties is ordered to
maintain medical, dental and optical
insurance on the children if it is
available through a group policy at their
place of employment and each is ordered
to pay one-half of all reasonable and
necessary major medical, dental and/or
optical expense incurred for and on
behalf of the children which is not
covered by a policy of insurance. The
Plaintiff's insurance shall be designated
as the primary carrier.

At the beginning of 1994, David became aware

that Gloria had returned to her employment at the United
States Postal Service on a full time basis over a year
earlier (TT 9-10). He filed the current Petition for
Modification on February 10, 1994 (ROA 146).
5.

Gloria earned in excess of $41,000.00 pursuant

to her 1993 W-2 (TT 17-18; Trial Ex. 2). She continued to
earn at that rate of pay throughout all of 1994 until
approximately four weeks prior to the hearing date in
August of 1994 (TT 17-18).
6.

Approximately four weeks before the hearing

date, Gloria voluntarily accepted a new position

at the

Postal Service which reduced her income to $2,838.00 per
month or $34,056.00 per year. The Court used this reduced
income in determining Gloria's proportional share of the
child support even though it had not been her historic
earnings (MFF 3).
7.

Even though Gloria had regained her full time

employment, she failed to make any voluntary child
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support or required medical payments to David from the
date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce until the time
of the Petition for Modification (TT 8; ADD C).

8.

After receiving testimony, the Court entered a

Finding from the bench. The Court found that there had
been a 300% increase in Gloria's earning capacity since
the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and that
she had discharged all of the debts assigned to her in
the Decree of Divorce by way of bankruptcy. The Court
found that the Decree of Divorce was based upon an
earning capacity of $990.00 for Gloria but that she now
had a sum of at least $2,838.00 per month available to
her. The Court found that such a change constituted a
material and substantial change in circumstances with
respect to the issue of child support (TT 56; MFF 3 & 5;
MCL 1).
9.

Gloria argued that the Court could not modify

the child support because she alleged that her expenses
had increased in direct proportion to her income. The
Court declined to accept that line of reasoning (TT 4556) .
10.

After

determining

that

there

had

been

a

substantial and material change in circumstances with
respect to the issues involving child support, the Court
reopened the issue of child support and allowed Gloria to
8

present any evidence that she desired to offer to show
why the presumptive child support guidelines should not
be applied (TT 52-53, 55-57).
11.

The Court issued its Memorandum Decision and

subsequently its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Petition for Modification on November 4, 1994
(ADD B ) .
12.
income

The Court found that based on the present

of

the

parties,

the

Uniform

Child

Support

Guidelines provided for child support to be paid from
Gloria to David in the sum of $689.00 per month; however,
the Court then stated "the only question remaining to the
Court

is whether good

cause exists to deviate, at

Defendant's request, from the guideline amount" (MFF 7;
ADD B ) .
13.

The Court then commenced a detailed analysis of

Gloria's income and monthly expenses. The Court examined
her expenses to determine which of those expenses might
be extraordinary. After completing the detailed analysis,
the Court found grounds to rebut the presumed child
support and, therefore, reduced same to the sum of
$525.00 per month (MFF 8 and 9; ADD B ) .
14.

The Court declined to make the child support

retroactive back to the filing of the Petition even
though the Petition had been filed for over one (1) year.
The Court reasoned that the Defendant would not be able
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to pay the retroactive child support since she had no
savings (MFF 10; ADD B ) .
15.

In establishing child support at the sum of

$525.00 per month, the Court reviewed each of the factors
contained in Section 78-45-7(3), U.C.A. and provided a
detailed evaluation of same (MFF 11; ADD B ) .
16.

David was awarded one-half of his Court costs

and attorney's fees for the Modification Hearing (MFF 15;
MCL 4; ADD B ) .
17.

Gloria's Notice of Appeal was timely filed (ROA

211) .
18.

Gloria

has

not

paid

any

child

support,

attorney's fees, medical payments or child care costs
since the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce (ADD
C).
19.

After

the

entry

of

the

Court's Order on

Petition for Modification, Gloria threatened David with
the current appeal unless he would take less than the
Court ordered child support (ADD C ) .
20.

Even though Gloria's appeal does not raise any

issues concerning the child care costs or the attorney's
fee award, Gloria has failed to pay any of those sums
either (ADD C ) .
21.

David and the minor children are suffering

substantial economic hardship as a result of the current
appeal (ADD C ) .
10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
David contends that Gloria has failed to apply the
appropriate standard of review in this case. An analysis
of Gloria's arguments demonstrates that she is attacking
the Trial Courtf s Finding of Fact with respect to its
determination that there had been a substantial and
material change of circumstance concerning the child
support issue since the time of entry of the Decree of
Divorce. Gloria is required

to marshal

all of the

evidence in support of the Findings and demonstrate,
despite the evidence, that the Trial Court's Findings
were

clearly

erroneous. Gloria

has

failed

in that

responsibility; therefore, this Court should refuse to
consider her attack upon the Trial Courtfs child support
award.
In Arguendot Gloria contends that the language used
by

the original Divorce Court in determining child

support created a standard for review that must be used
by a future Court in making any modifications of the
original

child

support

award.

Gloria

presents

no

statutory authority and no caselaw for her position.
Additionally, she ignores the current child support
statute and offers caselaw which was decided years before
the adoption of the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines
as currently expressed in Section 78-45-1 et. seq., Utah
Code Annotated. Additionally, her argument requires a
11

distorted and inaccurate interpretation of the language
contained in the original Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce, Since Gloria has failed to
offer any viable legal argument to attack the Trial
Court's

Findings

of

Fact

or

its

determination

or

application of the law, the Trial Court's child support
award should be affirmed.
David contends that Gloria has filed the current
appeal for the sole purpose of thwarting David's attempts
to gain contribution from Gloria for the support of the
children. As evidence of what David believes to be the
real purpose of the appeal, he points to the total lack
of meritorious arguments offered by Gloria in her brief
and further points to her consistent non-performance of
all orders of the Court, most of which are not under
appeal. David requests that this Court find that the
current appeal is without merit and was either frivolous
or intended to delay the collection of child support. He
further requests that this Court establish a time for
hearing pursuant to Rule

33 of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure or, alternatively, that the matter be
remanded

to

the

Trial

Court

for

determination

of

Appellee's reasonable attorney's fees and Court costs on
appeal.

12

ARGUMENT

SINCE THE APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE
WHICH SUPPORTED THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND,
DESPITE SUCH EVIDENCE, DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FINDINGS WERE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO
CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON THE TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT
AWARD.
A review of Appellant's argument indicates that the
Appellant is really attacking the Trial Court's Findings
of Fact and not just its Conclusions of Law. The Trial
Court entered numerous and express Findings of Fact in
the case at bar. Those Findings should be reviewed in
light of the guidelines found in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
Rule 52: Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury..., the
court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58A;...Findings of Fact,
whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, ghalj not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to
the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of
the court. It will be sufficient if the
findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open
court following the close of the evidence
or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court...
[Emphasis added by Order of the
Utah Supreme Court on October
13

30, 1986 and became effective
on January 1, 1987.]
An analysis of the 1987 modification of Rule 52(a)
demonstrates a clear intent to avoid retrying the facts
of the case at the Appellate level. Since a divorce
action is an equitable case, the Trial Courts have been
given broad discretion in making awards. Riche v. Riche,
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989); Sukin v. Sukinr 842 P.2d
922 (Utah App. 1992); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156
(Utah App. 1989); Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979 (Utah App.
1989);

Shioji v.

Appellate

Courts

Shioji, 712 P.2d
have

197

traditionally

(Utah

1985).

granted

great

deference to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and do
not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. In
reviewing an award of child support, the Appellate Courts
accord

substantial

deference

to

the

Trial

Court's

Findings and give the Trial Court considerable latitude
in fashioning the appropriate relief. Watson v. Watson,
837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992); Woodward v. Woodward, 709
P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). Additionally, Appellate Courts have
traditionally deferred to the Trial Court for purposes of
judging the

credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure; Myers, supra; Shioji, supra;
Riche, supra.
In Riche v. Riche, supra, this Court stated:
Husband, in his brief on appeal, refers
this court to evidence which conflicts
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with the trial courtf s findings and
supports his contention that he should
have been awarded custody of the four
children. However, Husband does not
"marshal the evidence in support of the
findings
and
then
demonstrate
that
despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to
be ^against the clear weight of the
evidence,! thus making them ^clearly
erroneous. '" Bartejl, 776 P.2d at 886
(guoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). See
also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1070 (Utah 1985); Harker v. Condominiums
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, we
decline to further consider Husband's
attack on the court's findings as to
custody. (Riche, supra p. 468). [Emphasis
added].
In Shioji, the Supreme Court has also expressly
provided:
On appeal from a judgment of the Trial
Court, our [Appellate Court] role is not
to substitute our own findings for those
of the Trial Court, but to examine the
record
for
evidence
supporting
the
judgment.
(Shioji, supra, at 201) [Emphasis added]
Given that express statement of the role of the
Appellate

Court,

responsibility of

the

Appellant

is

charged

with

the

(1) marshaling all the evidence in

support of the Findings, and

(2) demonstrating that,

despite that evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence.
In the case at bar, Gloria contends that the Trial
Court

erred

in

its

Conclusions

15

of

Law

because

it

"misunderstood or misapplied the Law". (See, Appellant's
brief p. 1). However, a review of the actual argument
(more fully discussed in Point II of this brief) reveals
that Gloria is actually attacking the Findings of Fact of
the Trial Court and, therefore, she has not applied the
proper Standard of Review. She has not marshaled all of
the evidence which was presented to the Trial Court nor
made any attempt to evaluate the Court's reasoning nor
has she demonstrated that the reasoning or the Findings
based thereon were clearly erroneous. Instead, Gloria
misstates the position of the original Trial Court (the
Divorce Court) and then argues that the Modification
Court is, somehow, permanently bound by the child support
language contained in the Decree of Divorce as long as
Gloria's expenditures exceed her income. Gloria presented
absolutely no statutory authority for her position and
the caselaw she presents is outdated and superseded by
the new child support statute as will be more fully
discussed hereafter.
Since the Appellant has failed to marshal all of the
evidence and, despite such evidence, demonstrate that the
Court's Findings concerning child support were clearly
erroneous, this Court should refuse to consider any
further attack on the Trial Court's child support award.
Hagan v. Haganf 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991).

16

Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness and
are given no special deference on appeal. Howell v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991); Smith v. Smith,
793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990).
II
SINCE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY VIABLE LEGAL
ARGUMENT TO ATTACK THE TRIAL COURT" S FINDINGS OF FACT OR
ITS DETERMINATION OR APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANT LAW, THE
TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Appellant's position is best summarized by the last
sentence contained in her two page Argument:
"it was not proper for the Court to find
that
a
substantial
change
in
circumstances
existed
sufficient to
modify
Mrs. Hight's
child
support
obligations without determining that Mrs.
Hight *s present living expenses and costs
for medical treatment and expenses had
not also increased so as to still reguire
all of Mrs. Hightfs present income."
The logical extension of the Appellant's position is that
as long as Gloria increases her expenditures faster than
she increases her income, she should never be required to
pay any child support. In short, if she earned a million
dollars and spent a million and one, her children would
not be entitled to any contribution from their mother.
The position is indefensible for three reasons: (1)
Appellant's

argument

relies

upon

an

inaccurate

and

distorted interpretation of the child support provision
contained in Findings of Fact originally issued in the
divorce action; (2) Appellant's argument ignores the
17

procedures utilized and the Findings of Fact adopted by
the Trial Court during the Petition for Modification
process; and (3) Appellant's argument ignores the express
language of the current child support statute and relies
upon caselaw that is no longer applicable as a result of
said statute.
First,

Appellant's

argument

relies

upon

an

inaccurate and distorted interpretation of the child
support provision contained in the Findings of Fact
originally issued in the divorce action. Gloria quotes
selected language from Paragraph 9 of the Divorce Court's
Findings of Fact; however, a review of all of the
Findings of Fact and all of the language contained
therein demonstrates that the Court intended the child
support award to be based only on the facts that existed
at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce (ADD
A) . At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce,
Gloria was on

a part-time work schedule and received an

income of $990.00 per month from her employment (DFF 5;
ADD A). David was working as a Sears repairman and earned
$2,400.00 per month from his employment (DFF 6; ADD A ) .
David was awarded the sole care and custody of the
parties' three young children (DFF 7; ADD A). Gloria was
not awarded any alimony because David's limited earning
capacity did not allow for the payment of same while he
was trying to support the children and also contribute to
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the payment of Gloria's medical debts (DFF 10; ADD A ) .
The Court ordered each of the parties to pay one-half of
the $17,805.90 in medical bills incurred by Gloria after
the separation of the parties but immediately prior to
the trial in the

divorce matter (DFF 11; ADD A; ADD F ) .

With that information in mind, the Divorce Court entered
Finding of Fact 9:
The Court will not require Defendant
(Gloria) to pay child support to the
Plaintiff (David) to assist with the
support of the children at this time
because the Defendant will need all of
her available income to take care of her
living expenses as well as meet payments
on the large debt obligations which she
owes for her medical treatment and
expenses.
Gloria now contends that the language of the Divorce
Courtf s Finding of Fact and the subsequent order stating
that she was not required to pay any child support
established a permanent standard for all subsequent child
support reviews. It is her position that the Modification
Court could not alter the child support provision in the
Decree of Divorce unless it could first establish that
she did not need all of her available income to take care
of

her

current

living

expenses

and medical needs.

Appellant never established any statutory or common law
basis for her argument. A careful review of Finding of
Fact 9 entered at the time of the divorce indicates that
the Divorce Court contemplated a change of the child
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support

award when

Gloria

regained

her employment.

Finding of Fact 9 clearly specifies "at this time" the
Court would not award child support. All of the parties
agree

that

the

Trial

Court

jurisdiction to review child

maintains

continuing

support awards when a

substantial and material change of circumstances has
occurred with respect to the issue to be modified. Haslam
v. Haslamr 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982); Appellant's brief at
p. 7.
In the case at bar, the Modification Court heard
considerable testimony about the dramatic increase in
Gloria's earning capacity since the time of the entry of
the Decree of Divorce. Additionally, it received evidence
that she had bankrupted against all of the medical debts
that she had at the time of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce. Additionally, the two separate changes in the
child support guidelines themselves since the time of the
entry of the Decree of Divorce would constitute grounds
for a modification of the child support award if it would
result in an increase of child support by more than
twenty-five (25%) percent which was the situation in the
case at bar (Section 78-45-7(3) U.C.A; ADD D ) .
The Modification

Court was

not

impressed

with

Appellant's argument at the time of the hearing and so
advised her counsel (TT 49-57). The Modification Court
refused

to

be

drawn

into
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Appellant's

distorted

interpretation of the Divorce Court's original Findings
of Fact and, instead, found that a 300% increase in
Gloria's earning capacity since the time of the entry of
the Decree of Divorce, coupled with the discharge of all
of her debts from the time of the Decree of Divorce,
constituted

a

substantial

and

material

change

in

circumstances sufficient to reopen the issue of child
support (MFF 3, 4, & 5; MCL 1; TT 56; ADD B ) .
Since Appellant has failed to marshal any of the
evidence which supported the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact and since Appellant has failed to provide any legal
basis for her theory that a subsequent Court is bound by
the Divorce Court's child support language, this Court
should refuse to consider an attack on the Trial Court's
child support award.
Second, Appellant's argument ignores the procedures
utilized and the Findings of Fact adopted by the Trial
Court during the Petition for Modification process.
Gloria contends that the Modification Court could not
modify the child support award in the Decree as long as
her

present

living

expenses

and

costs

for medical

treatment had increased proportionally with her increased
income. Her brief failed to advise this Court of the
extensive procedural discussion which ensued during the
hearing

on

the

Petition

for

Modification.

The

Modification Court reviewed the bifurcation process, drew
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analogies to the procedures used in custody modification
hearings and ultimately adopted a procedure that required
the Petitioner to establish that a substantial and
material

change

in

circumstances

had

occurred with

respect to the issues which were determinative of the
original child support order i.e. the relative earning
capacities of the parties and their respective debt
levels (TT 49-57). After receiving substantial testimony,
the Court entered a ruling from the bench. The Court
found that a 300% increase in Gloria's earning capacity,
which increased her income from $990.00 per month to
$2,838.00

per

month,

constituted

a

material

and

substantial change directly affecting her ability to pay
child support (TT 56). Having made that determination,
the Court then advised that the issue of child support
would

be

reopened

and

explored

anew

(TT 52). The

Modification Court then applied the Utah Uniform Child
Support

Guidelines

and

received

extensive

testimony

offered by Gloria in an attempt to rebut the presumption
in favor of the guidelines. The Court then entered
specific Findings of Fact which fully explored the
earning

capacities

of

each

of

the

parties,

their

respective standards of living and costs and expenses
related thereto, their medical conditions, the needs of
the

children,

the

age

of

the

parties,

and

their

respective support obligations. Additionally, the Court
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fully explored Gloria's representations concerning her
medical expenditures

(MFF 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15).

Finally, the Court entered specific Findings to justify
a deviation from the child support guidelines in order to
provide Gloria with some additional funds to offset her
medical expenses (MFF 8C & 9). Appellant has failed to
marshal any of the evidence that supported the detailed
Findings

of

Fact

and

ultimate

orders

that

issued

therefrom. She also failed to offer any legal authority
attacking the Court's methodology. As such, the Appellant
failed to meet her standard of review and, therefore,
this Court should refuse to consider any further attack
on the Trial Court's child support award.
Third, Appellant's argument ignores the express
language of the current child support statute and relies
upon irrelevant caselaw that was decided under an earlier
statute. Section 78-45-1, et. seq. U.C.A., the Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act, established an entirely
new approach to the determination of child support
awards. Specifically, Section 78-45-7.2, provides in
relevant part, as follows:
Application of guidelines - Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial
or administrative order establishing
or modifying an award o£ child
support entered on or after July 1,
1989.
(2)

(a) The child support guidelines
shall
be
applied
as
a
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rebuttable
presumption
in
establishing or modifying the
amount
of
temporary
or
permanent child support.
(b) The
rebuttable
presumption
means
the
provisions
and
considerations required by the
guidelines, the award amounts
resulting from the application
of the guidelines, and the use
of the worksheets consistent
with these guidelines are
presumed to be correct, unless
rebutted under the provisions
of this section.
(6) With regard to child support orders,
enactment of the guidelines and any
subsequent change in the guidelines
constitutes
a
substantial
or
material change of circumstances as
a
ground
for modification
or
adjustment of a court order, if
there is a difference of at least
25% between the existing order and
the guidelines. (As amended 1994).
[Emphasis added].
The statute clearly requires the application of the Utah
Uniform Child Support Guidelines to any modification of
a child support award entered on or after July 1, 1989.
In the case at bar, the Modification Court adopted the
express procedure contained in the new statute. After
finding a substantial change of circumstances, the Court
adopted the presumptive guidelines (TT 51-52). It then
required that Gloria rebut the presumption to establish
a justification for an award of child support at less
than the amount specified in the guidelines.
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Gloria, however, directs this Court to caselaw
decided prior to the adoption of the presumptive child
support guidelines. She first cites Haslam v. Haslam, 657
P.2d 757 (Utah 1982). Contrary to her argument, the
Haslam

decision

stands

for

the

proposition

that

"provisions in the original Decree of Divorce granting
alimony, child support and the like must be readily
susceptible to alteration at a later date, as the needs
which such provisions were designed to fill are subject
to rapid and unpredictable change." Haslam, supra, at p.
758 citing Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981).
Nowhere does the Haslam decision attempt to tie the hands
of the Modification Court and require it to adhere to
some distorted interpretation of the language used by the
Trial Court in determining the original child support
award. Gloria then urges this Court to review the factors
applied to child support in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d
713 (Utah App. 1990). Although Ostler was decided in
1990, the trial on the Petition for Modification actually
occurred

in

1987. At that time, child

support was

controlled by a statute that required application of a
number

of

specific

factors

before

establishing

the

support award. As indicated by the Ostler Court at the
time of the Appellate decision, that statute had been
superseded by the 1989 statute (Section 78-45-7.14) and
said statute has again been superseded by the current
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statute (Section 78-45-7.2). The Ostler Court remanded
the matter to the Trial Court to make a determination on
each of the factors listed in the prior statute. In the
case at bar, the Court was not required to utilize those
factors as the current statute eliminated the factors and
set a presumptive level of child support.
Appellant has failed to provide any basis for her
attack upon the award of child support set by the Trial
Court. She has ignored the child support statute in its
entirety. She has cited caselaw which does not support
her contention and which was decided long before the
adoption of the presumptive child support guidelines. She
has failed to marshal all of the evidence that supported
the

Trial

Court's

Findings

and

then, despite

such

evidence, demonstrate that the Trial Court's Findings
were clearly erroneous. Finally, she has omitted the only
relevant case that has been decided since the adoption of
the guidelines, namely, Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540
(Utah App. 1993).
In Baker, the Court discussed the procedure for the
application of the various sections of the child support
statute. The case supports the procedure and methodology
used by the Trial Court in the case at bar. It instructs
the Trial Court to apply the presumptive child support
guidelines and then, only where there is sufficient
evidence to rebut the guidelines, should the Court
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consider the factors outlined in Section 78-45-7(3) of
the

statute.

A

review

of

the

Modification

Court's

Findings of Fact demonstrates that the Court addressed
each factor contained in Section 78-45-7(3) (MFF 11 A-G).
In

reviewing

an

award

Appellate Courts accord

of

child

substantial

support,

the

deference to the

Trial Court's Findings and give it considerable latitude
in fashioning an appropriate relief. Baker, supra at p.
29; Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d

1

(Utah App.

1992);

Woodward, supra at p. 394. Additionally, the Appellate
Courts do not disturb the Trial Court ! s actions "unless
the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or
there has been an abuse of discretion." Baker, supra at
p. 29; Woodward, supra at p. 394. In the case at bar, the
Trial Court received
substantial

evidence that there had been a

and material

change of circumstance with

respect to Gloria's ability to contribute to the support
of her children. The Court then adopted the presumptive
child support guidelines in express conformity with the
child support statute. It received additional testimony
about Gloria's ongoing expenses and entered

specific

Findings of Fact on each and every factor in Section 7845-7(3) U.C.A. Finally, the Court entered a child support
award that was less than the amount specified in the
guidelines

in

order

assistance

in

meeting

to

provide

her
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Gloria

ongoing

with

expenses.

some
Since

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that any of the
Findings of Fact or the methodology utilized by the Court
were in error, this Court should affirm the child support
award.
Ill
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEE
ON APPEAL.
Rule

33,

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure,

provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous
appeal. Except in a first appeal of right
in a criminal case, if the court
determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award
just damages, which may include single or
double costs, as in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable
attorney
fees,
to
the
prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or
by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of
these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good
faith argument to extend, modify or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass,
cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper.
David requests that he be awarded his Court costs
and attorney's fees on this appeal on the grounds that
the

appeal

is frivolous and without merit and was
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intended solely to delay payment of the child support
award. This Court has made it clear that it has the
authority

to

award

costs

and

attorney's

fees

under

appropriate circumstances. McGinty v. McGinty, Memo D e c ,
March 9, 1995 (Utah App. Case No. 930569-CA) (ADD E ) ;
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989); Eames v.
Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987). The recent substantial
revisions of Rule 33 define a frivolous appeal as one
that is not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law
or which is interposed for purposes of delay. In Eames,
supra, the Supreme Court stated that a husband's appeal
from a judgment relating to the distribution of marital
property was frivolous where there was no basis for the
argument presented and the evidence and law were mischaracterized and misstated.
It

should

be noted

that the Modification

Court

awarded David one-half of his Court costs and attorney's
fees incurred at the Modification Hearing. The Court
provided an extensive analysis of its justification for
that award (MFF 15; ADD B ) .
Applying the standard for an award of attorney's
fees as outlined above to the case at bar lends strong
support for an award to David. David contends that Gloria
filed the current appeal for the sole purpose of delaying
payment to him. Since the time of the entry of the
Court's ruling in this case, Gloria has failed to pay any
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child support whatsoever. She has failed to pay any of
the Court costs or attorney's fees awarded in by the
Trial Court even though that issue was not appealed (ADD
C). As indicated by David's Affidavit (ADD C ) , he has
received no voluntary support whatsoever from Gloria for
the benefit of the minor children since the time of the
entry of the Decree of Divorce on January 18, 1991. The
Office

of

Recovery

Services

received

$310.00

by

garnishment of taxes but has been unwilling to pursue the
child support obligation because of the pending appeal
(ADD C ) . Additionally, Gloria has attempted to use the
appeal to force a settlement of the child support at
amounts less than awarded by the Trial Court (ADD C ) .
As in McGinty and Eames, David contends that he
should be granted his costs and attorney's fees because
an analysis of Gloria's argument demonstrates that it was
frivolous in nature. Appellant has failed to provide this
Court with any rational basis for overturning the Trial
Court's decision. She has not attempted to marshal all
the evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings and
then argue that, despite such evidence, the Trial Court's
Findings

were

clearly

erroneous

or

an

abuse

of

discretion. She has failed to provide this Court with any
legal theory that would give it grounds for overturning
the Trial Court nor has she provided any caselaw that
would support her position in this case. She has ignored
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the applicable child support statute and the current
caselaw that is determinative of this matter. Such "lack
of meritorious issues" supports David's contention that
the sole purpose for this appeal was to delay the
imposition and collection of child support as directed by
the Trial Court in this matter.
From the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the appeal, it genuinely appears that the appeal exists
for the sole purpose of thwarting David's attempts to
gain contribution from Gloria for the support of the
children. The current appeal raises no issue with respect
to the payment of attorney's fees at the Trial Court
level; however, they remain unpaid (ADD C). The current
appeal raises no issue with respect to the payment of
child care costs; however, they remain unpaid (ADD C).
The current appeal raises no issue with respect to
medical expenses incurred for the children; however, they
remain unpaid (ADD C ) . Such a course of performance,
coupled with the lack of any meritorious arguments,
strongly suggests that the appeal exists solely to stall
collection of child support.
David requests that this Court find that the current
appeal is without merit and was either frivolous or
intended to cause delay. He requests that the Court award
him costs and attorney's fees and establish a time for
hearing pursuant to Rule 33 or, alternatively, remand to
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the

Trial

Court

for a determination

of

reasonable

attorney's fees and Court costs on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Gloria has failed to apply the appropriate standard
of review in the case at bar. She has failed to marshal
all of the evidence in support of the Trial Court's
Findings and then demonstrate, despite such evidence,
that the Trial Court's Findings were clearly erroneous.
She attempts to argue a position for which no statutory
or common law exists. She has ignored the current child
support statute and the Baker case which explains the
statute. She has failed to offer any viable legal
argument which would attack the Trial Court's Findings or
its determination or application of the law. In fact, the
complete lack of merit of her arguments coupled with the
circumstances surrounding the appeal strongly suggest
that the appeal was filed for the sole purpose of
delaying the enforcement of child support or coercing a
reduction of same. As such, this Court should affirm the
Trial Court's child support award and remand this matter
to the Trial Court for a determination of Appellee's
Court costs and attorney's fees on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May, 1994.

JOANE^fKFPAS WHITE
Attorney for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE, by delivering same on this 19th day of May,
1995 to the following:
Harry Caston
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Suite 600 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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ADDENDUM A
ORIGINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
FROM THE DIVORCE ACTION

^ - • r ; ; K ^ ORIGINAL
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (810) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID HIGHT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
;)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
;

GLORIA J. HIGHT,
Defendant.

i

Civil No.

15978

\

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
trial before the Court on the 15th day of October, 1990, the
Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge presiding; and, the
Plaintiff appeared personally and with his counsel, JOANE
PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant appeared personally and with
her counsel JOHN E. SCHINDLER; and, the Court heard sworn
testimony and received exhibits and announced findings from
the bench and a ruling concerning the issue of custody of the
minor children which ruling will now be repeated herein; and,
the Court took the balance of the issues under advisement;
and, each of the parties filed a Motion to Reconsider certain
items contained in the Court's original Memorandum Decision
and the rulings on said Motions are contained herein; and, the
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Court having been fully advised in the premises now finds as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the parties hereto were actual and bona

fide residents of Price, Carbon County, State of Utah, and had
been for more than three (3) months immediately next prior to
the commencement of this action.
2.

That

the

Plaintiff

and

the

Defendant

were

married on the 17th day of January, 1981 at Orem, Utah County,
state of Utah and have been husband and wife since that time.
3.

That there have been three (3) children born

as the issue of this marriage, namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT,
born October 25, 1985; ADAM PARKER HIGHT, born June 5, 1987
and SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 (Twin boys).
4.
have

occurred

The Court finds that irreconcilable differences
in

the marital

relationship

that

makes

it

impossible for the Plaintiff to continue in said relationship
and, therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled
to

a

Decree

of

Divorce

terminating

his marriage

to

the

Defendant. In reviewing the file, the Court finds that the
Defendant has no Answer or Counterclaim on file herein but
that the parties entered an oral stipulation at the time of
the Pretrial before the Court Commissioner whereby a general
denial was entered on the record in Defendant's behalf and was
deemed to constitute an Answer for the Defendant.
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5.
gross

sum

The Court finds that the Defendant earned a
of

EIGHT

THOUSAND

NINE

HUNDRED

SIXTY-THREE

($8,963.00) DOLLARS to the first part of October, 1990 from
her part-time

employment with

the United

States Postal

Department and, therefore, the Court finds that her average
gross income is the sum of NINE HUNDRED NINETY ($990.00)
DOLLARS per month for the year 1990.
6.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is currently

employed at Sears as a repairman and earns approximately TWO
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED ($2,4 00.00) DOLLARS per month from said
employment.
7.
entered

the

With respect to the issue of custody, the Court
following

Findings

of

Fact

from

the bench

following the presentation of evidence on October 15, 1990:
A.

That the Plaintiff has been the primary

caretaker of the three (3) minor children of the parties
during much of the time since their respective births and
particularly

for the last year since the Defendant was

hospitalized and subsequently separated from the Plaintiff.
B.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has

consistently demonstrated his willingness to place the needs
of the children ahead of his own needs and provide a stable
home environment for the children.
C.

The Court finds that the minor children

are doing well in the Plaintiff's care and finds that it would
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be in their best interest to maintain the stability which they
have in the Plaintiff's environment.
D.

The Court finds that the Defendant has

experienced ongoing emotional problems which have required
numerous hospitalizations and which have required various
medications.

Although

the

Defendant

appears

to

be

demonstrating an improvement in her condition, the Court finds
that the Plaintiff has never exhibited emotional problems or
been required to take prescriptions which have mood altering
effect.
E.

The Court is mindful of the various case

law establishing the criteria to evaluate and determine a
custody award. From the evidence the Court finds that it is
in the best interests of the minor children of the parties
that their care, custody and control be awarded to the
Plaintiff.
8.

The Court finds that it is in the best interest

of the children that they have visitation with their mother
and that said visitation should be on a regular basis without
being overly disruptive of their normal home environment;
therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant should be
entitled to reasonable visitation with the minor children, at
all reasonable times and places, including but not limited to
the following:

4

A.

The Defendant shall be entitled to take

the children every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Fridays
until 7:30 p.m. on Sundays; and
B.

The Defendant shall be entitled to visit

with the children commencing at 9:30 a.m. and terminating at
7:30 p.m. on every other major holiday which shall be deemed
to

be

Easter,

Memorial

Day,

July

4,

Labor

Day

and

Thanksgiving. She shall commence her holiday visits with
Thanksgiving of 1990; and
C.

The Defendant shall be entitled to visit

with the minor children every Christmas holiday commencing at
9:30 a.m. on December 2 6th and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on
December 29th; and
D.

The Plaintiff shall be entitled to have

the children every Father's Day and the Defendant shall have
the right to visit with the children every Mother's Day,
irrespective of weekend visitations; and
E.

The Defendant shall be entitled to take

the children for two (2) weeks during the month of June and
two (2) weeks during the month of August of each school summer
vacation period and the Defendant shall be allowed designate
the dates

for said

summer visitation

provided

that she

notifies the Plaintiff of those dates by May 1st of each year.
F.

The Plaintiff should keep the Defendant

advised of any major medical care required for the

children

5
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as well as keeping her advised of their progress in school and
other significant aspects of the children's lives.
9.

The Court will not require the Defendant to pay

child support to the Plaintiff to assist with the support of
the children at this time because the Defendant will need all
of her available income to take care of her living expenses
as well as meet payments on the large debt obligations which
she owes for her medical treatment and expenses.
10.

Based on the Plaintiff's present income and his

obligation to solely support his children because of the
Defendant's current limited earning capacity and debt level
and because of the Court's Order requiring the Plaintiff to
contribute to the payment of medical debts for the benefit of
the Defendant, the Court will not order the Plaintiff to pay
the Defendant any alimony.
11.

The Court further finds that the Plaintiff

should be required to pay the debts listed on his financial
statement, namely, the Hanover Mastercard (new account), the
Hanover Mastercard (old account), the Discover card, the Sears
card, the children's ABC books, and the Fleetwood mortgage
debt as well as the miscellaneous medical and dental providers
expenses

incurred

on behalf

of the minor children. The

Plaintiff is further ordered to pay one-half of all the
outstanding medical bills incurred by the Defendant as shown
on her Financial Declaration. The Defendant is also ordered
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to pay one-half of all the outstanding medical bills incurred
by her as designated in her Financial Declaration.
12.

Each of the parties is ordered to maintain

medical, dental and optical insurance on the children if it
is

available

employment

through

and

each

a
is

group

policy

ordered

to

at

pay

their

place

one-half

of

of
all

reasonable and necessary major medical, dental and/or optical
expense incurred for and on behalf of the children which is
not

covered

by

a

policy

of

insurance.

The

Plaintiff's

insurance shall be designated as the primary carrier.
13.

The parties hereto have accumulated some real

and personal property during this marriage and said property
is awarded and distributed as follows:
A.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff will

need the use of the marital residence in order to provide a
home for the minor children and, therefore, the Court finds
that said home should be awarded to the Plaintiff provided
that he assumes the outstanding indebtedness thereon and holds
the Defendant harmless therefrom. The Court specifically finds
that the real property has an equity of approximately SIX
THOUSAND ($6,000.00) DOLLARS.
B.

The

Court

finds

that

the

1980

Honda

automobile and the 1974 Porsche automobile have a combined
value of approximately ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED ($1,900.00)
DOLLARS and that those vehicles have traditionally been the
Plaintiff's vehicles and that he should be awarded same.
7
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C.

The Court finds that the 1985 Ford Bronco

has a value of approximately EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
($8,500.00) DOLLARS and that said vehicle should be awarded
to the Defendant.
D.

The Court finds that the parties had

accumulated savings bonds during the marriage with a value of
approximately THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($3,500.00) DOLLARS
and that the bonds have been turned over to the Defendant and
should be awarded to her herein.
E.

The parties have previously divided the

balance of their personal property between them and the Court
finds that each party should be awarded those items in his or
her possession as of the date of hearing, namely, October 15,
1990 with the provision that the Plaintiff is ordered to
furnish to the Defendant

a working

and useable washing

machine.
F.

The Court finds that each of the parties

have accumulated retirement benefits through the course of
their respective employments and the Court finds that each of
the parties should be awarded his or her respective retirement
programs free and clear of any and all claims of the other
party.
14.
capacity

The

Court

finds

that

each

to pay his or her respective

party

Court

has the

Costs and

attorney's fees in this matter and that each party should be
ordered to do so.
8
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15.

Each of the parties hereto submitted a request

for the Court to reconsider part of the rulings in its
Memorandum

Decision, the Court has previously

entered a

Memorandum Decision on said Motions dated December 5, 1990
which is incorporated herein, as follows:
A.

Plaintiff

has

moved

the

Court

to

reconsider the medical debt distribution as previously ordered
by the Court based upon newly discovered evidence. It is the
contention of the Plaintiff that the Defendant incurred
medical bills for elective treatment that may have not been
covered by his insurance and, therefore, the Plaintiff should
not be required to pay all of those elective medical bills.
The Defendant has objected to any change and has denied the
elective nature of the surgery and treatment.
B.

The Defendant has also asked the Court to

reconsider the decision relative to the distribution of
personal property.
C.

The matters presented in these Motions

could have been aired at the time of the trial and the Court
finds that said Motions should be denied with the exception
that the Court will order that the Defendant should be given
one-half of the family photos of the children and any other
photos in the possession of the Plaintiff that are requested
for the purposes of having copies of same made.
D.

The

Court

expressly

finds

that

the

personal property distribution made in the Court's original
9
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Memorandum Decision was made so that the children could take
advantage of the majority, if not all, of the personal
property accumulated by the parties during the marriage.
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of
Fact now concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from

the Defendant.
2.

That the Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody

and control of the three (3) minor children of the parties,
namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, born October 25, 1985; ADAM
PARKER HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 and SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born
June 5, 1987 (Twin boys), subject to Defendant's rights to
visit said children at all reasonable times and places,
including but not limited to the following:
A.

The Defendant is entitled to take the

children every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Fridays until
7:30 p.m. on Sundays; and
B.

The Defendant is entitled to visit with

the children commencincf at 9:30 a.m. and terminating at 7:30
p.m. on every other major holiday which shall be deemed to be
Easter, Memorial Day, July 4, Labor Day and Thanksgiving. She
shall commence her holiday visits with Thanksgiving of 1990;
and
C.

The Defendant is entitled to visit with

the minor children every Christmas holiday commencing at 9:30
10

ooon:

a.m. on December 26th and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on
December 2 9th; and
D.

The Plaintiff is entitled to have the

children every Father's Day and the Defendant shall have the
right

to

visit

with

the

children

every

Mother's

Day,

irrespective of weekend visitations; and
E.

The Defendant is entitled to take the

children for two (2) weeks during the month of June and two
(2) weeks during the month of August of each school summer
vacation period and the Defendant will be allowed designate
the dates

for said

summer visitation provided

that she

notifies the Plaintiff of those dates by May 1st of each year.
F.

The Plaintiff shall keep the Defendant

advised of any major medical care required for the children
as well as keeping her advised of their progress in school and
other significant aspects of the children's lives.
3.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

real and personal property during this marriage and said
property is awarded as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is awarded the home of the

parties provided that he assumes the outstanding indebtedness
thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded the 1980 Honda

automobile and the 1974 Porsche automobile.
C.

The Defendant is awarded the 1985 Ford

Bronco.
11
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D.

The Defendant is awarded the savings bonds

with a value of approximately THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
($3,500.00) DOLLARS.
E.

Each party is awarded those items of

personal property in his or her possession as of October 15,
1990.
F.

The Plaintiff is ordered to furnish the

Defendant with a working and useable washing machine.
G.

Each

party

is

awarded

his

or

her

respective retirement benefits, free and clear of all claims
of the other party.
4.

No child support is awarded herein.

5.

No alimony is awarded herein.

6.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

debts and obligations during the marriage and the Defendant
has accumulated certain debts and obligations for her medical
treatment following the separation of the parties, said debts
and obligations are allocated as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay

the outstanding debts and obligations as designated in his
Financial

Declaration,

namely,

Hanover

Mastercard

(new

account), Hanover Mastercard (old account), the Discover Card,
the Sears account, the children's ABC books, and the Fleetwood
mortgage on the home together with various medical and dental
bills accumulated on behalf of the minor children.

12
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B.

The Plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half

of the medical expenses incurred by the Defendant as stated
in her Financial Declaration,
C.

The Defendant is ordered to pay one-half

of the medical expenses incurred by her as stated in her
Financial Declaration.
7.

Each party is ordered to maintain medical,

dental and optical insurance on the minor children of the
parties if it is available through a group policy at their
place of employment, as a benefit of their employment at
little or no expense and each party is further ordered to pay
one-half of any reasonable and necessary major medical, dental
and/or optical expense incurred for and on behalf of the minor
children which is not covered by a policy of insurance. The
Plaintiffs

insurance shall be designated as the primary

carrier.
8.

Each party

is ordered

to pay his or her

respective Court costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
9.

Each parties7 Motion for Reconsideration is
^

hereby denied.
DATED this

//(

day of J^nuaxy, 1991.

^ ^ ^

/ Di^trict^ourt'--4Judg:e
APPROVED AS TO FORM £ CONTENT;

JOHN ;E. SCHINDLER
Attgi-ney for Defendant
13
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (810) 637-0177
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID HIGHT,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
GLORIA J. HIGHT,

]
)
]
]
i

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No.

15978

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
trial before the Court on the 15th day of October, 1990, the
Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge presiding; and, the
Plaintiff appeared personally and with his counsel, JOANE
PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant appeared personally and with
her counsel JOHN E. SCHINDLER; and, the Court heard sworn
testimony and received exhibits and announced findings from
the bench and a ruling concerning the issue of custody of the
minor children which ruling will now be repeated herein; and,
the Court took the balance of the issues under advisement;
and, each of the parties filed a Motion to Reconsider certain
items contained in the Court's original Memorandum Decision
and the rulings on said Motions are contained herein; and, the
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Court having been fully advised in the premises and having
entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from

the Defendant.
2.

That the Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody

and control of the three (3) minor children of the parties,
namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, born October 25, 1985; ADAM
PARKER HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 and SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born
June 5, 1987 (Twin boys), subject to Defendant's rights to
visit said children at all reasonable times and places,
including but not limited to the following:
A.

The Defendant is entitled to take the

children every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Fridays until
7:30 p.m. on Sundays; and
B.

The Defendant is entitled to visit with

the children commencing at 9:30 a.m. and terminating at 7:30
p.m. on every other major holiday which shall be deemed to be
Easter, Memorial Day, July 4, Labor Day and Thanksgiving. She
shall commence her holiday visits with Thanksgiving of 1990;
and
C.

The Defendant is entitled to visit with

the minor children every Christmas holiday commencing at 9:30

2
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a.m. on December 2 6th and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on
December 29th; and
D.

The Plaintiff is entitled to have the

children every Father's Day and the Defendant shall have the
right

to

visit

with

the

children

every

Mother's

Day,

irrespective of weekend visitations; and
E.

The Defendant is entitled to take the

children for two (2) weeks during the month of June and two
(2) weeks during the month of August of each school summer
vacation period and the Defendant will be allowed designate
the dates

for said

summer visitation provided

that she

notifies the Plaintiff of those dates by May 1st of each year.
F.

The Plaintiff is ordered to keep the

Defendant advised of any major medical care required for the
children as well as keeping her advised of their progress in
school and other significant aspects of the children's lives.
3.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

real and personal property during this marriage and said
property is awarded as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is awarded the home of the

parties provided that he assumes the outstanding indebtedness
thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded the 1980 Honda

automobile and the 1974 Porsche automobile.
C.

The Defendant is awarded the 1985 Ford

Bronco.
3
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D.

The Defendant is awarded the savings bonds

with a value of approximately THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
($3,500.00) DOLLARS.
E.

Each party is awarded those items of

personal property in his or her possession as of October 15,
1990.
F.

The Plaintiff is ordered to furnish the

Defendant with a working and useable washing machine.
G.

Each

party

is

awarded

his

or

her

respective retirement benefits, free and clear of all claims
of the other party.
4.

No child support is awarded herein.

5.

No alimony is awarded herein.

6.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

debts and obligations during the marriage and the Defendant
has accumulated certain debts and obligations for her medical
treatment following the separation of the parties, said debts
and obligations are allocated as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay

the outstanding debts and obligations as designated in his
Financial

Declaration,

namely,

Hanover

Mastercard

(new

account), Hanover Mastercard (old account), the Discover Card,
the Sears account, the children's ABC books, and the Fleetwood
mortgage on the home together with various medical and dental
bills accumulated on behalf of the minor children.

4
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B.

The Plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half

of the medical expenses incurred by the Defendant as stated
in her Financial Declaration.
C.

The Defendant is ordered to pay one-half

of the medical expenses incurred by her as stated in her
Financial Declaration.
7.

Each party is ordered to maintain medical,

dental and optical insurance on the minor children of the
parties if it is available through a group policy at their
place of employment, as a benefit of their employment at
little or no expense and each party is further ordered to pay
one-half of any reasonable and necessary major medical, dental
and/or optical expense incurred for and on behalf of the minor
children which is not covered by a policy of insurance. The
Plaintiff's insurance shall be designated as the primary
carrier.
8.

Each party

is ordered

to pay his or her

respective Court costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
9.

Each parties' Motion for Reconsideration is

APPROVED AS TO FORM •fitCONTENT:

Mm 1 iLLll

JOHN1 E .

SCHINDLER

At"torney f o r

Defendant
5
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (810) 637-0177
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID HIGHT,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
GLORIA J. HIGHT,

]I
)
]|
]
i

AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE
NUNC PRO TUNC
Civil No.

15978

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
trial before the Court on the 15th day of October, 1990, the
Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge presiding; and, the
Plaintiff appeared personally and with his counsel, JOANE
PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant appeared personally and with
her counsel JOHN E. SCHINDLER; and, the Court heard sworn
testimony and received exhibits and announced findings from
the bench and a ruling concerning the issue of custody of the
minor children which ruling will now be repeated herein; and,
the Court took the balance of the issues under advisement;
and, each of the parties filed a Motion to Reconsider certain
items contained in the Court's original Memorandum Decision
and the rulings on said Motions are contained herein; and, the

Court having been fully advised in the premises and having
entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from

the Defendant.
2.

That the Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody

and control of the three (3) minor children of the parties,
namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, born October 25, 1985; ADAM
PARKER HIGHT, b o m June 5, 1987 and SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born
June 5, 1987 (Twin boys), subject to Defendants rights to
visit said children at all reasonable times and places,
including but not limited to the following:
A.

The Defendant is entitled to take the

children every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Fridays until
7:30 p.m. on Sundays; and
B.

The Defendant is entitled to visit with

the children commencing at 9:30 a.m. and terminating at 7:30
p.m. on every other major holiday which shall be deemed to be
Easter, Memorial Day, July 4, Labor Day and Thanksgiving. She
shall commence her holiday visits with Thanksgiving of 1990;
and
C.

The Defendant is entitled to visit with

the minor children every Christmas holiday commencing at 9:30

2

a.m. on December 2 6th and continuing until 6:00 p.m. on
December 29th; and
D.

The Plaintiff is entitled to have the

children every Father's Day and the Defendant shall have the
right

to

visit

with

the

children

every

Mother's

Day,

irrespective of weekend visitations; and
E.

The Defendant is entitled to take the

children for two (2) weeks during the month of June and two
(2) weeks during the month of August of each school summer
vacation period and the Defendant will be allowed designate
the dates for said

summer visitation provided

that she

notifies the Plaintiff of those dates by May 1st of each year.
F.

The Plaintiff is ordered to keep the

Defendant advised of any major medical care required for the
children as well as keeping her advised of their progress in
school and other significant aspects of the children's lives.
3.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain

real and personal property during this marriage and said
property is awarded as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is awarded the home of the

parties located at 286 North 100 West, Price, Utah, provided
that he assumes the outstanding indebtedness thereon and holds
the

Defendant

harmless

therefrom.

Said

home

is

more

particularly described as follows:

3
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BEGINNING at a point 50 feet South of the
Northwest Corner of Lot 2, Block 7, LOCAL
SURVEY, a.k.a. TIDWELL'S SURVEY of a part
of Section 16, Township 14 South, Range
10 East, of Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
according to the official plat thereof;
and running thence East 210 feet; thence
South 59 7/8 feet; thence West 210 feet;
thence North 59 7/8 feet to the point of
beginning.
Together
with
all
improvements
and
appurtenances thereunto appertaining.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded the 1980 Honda

automobile and the 1974 Porsche automobile.
C.

The Defendant is awarded the 1985 Ford

D.

The Defendant is awarded the savings bonds

Bronco.

with a value of approximately THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
($3,500.00) DOLLARS.
E.

Each

party

is awarded

those

items

of

personal property in his or her possession as of October 15,
1990.
F.

The Plaintiff is ordered to furnish the

Defendant with a working and useable washing machine.
G.

Each

party

is

awarded

his

or

her

respective retirement benefits, free and clear of all claims
of the other party.
4.

No child support is awarded herein.

5.

No alimony is awarded herein.

6.

The parties hereto have accumulated

certain

debts and obligations during the marriage and the Defendant
4
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has accumulated certain debts and obligations for her medical
treatment following the separation of the parties, said debts
and obligations are allocated as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay

the outstanding debts and obligations as designated in his
Financial

Declaration,

namely,

Hanover

Mastercard

(new

account) , Hanover Mastercard (old account) , the Discover Card,
the Sears account, the children's ABC books, and the Fleetwood
mortgage on the home together with various medical and dental
bills accumulated on behalf of the minor children.
B.

The Plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half

of the medical expenses incurred by the Defendant as stated
in her Financial Declaration.
C.

The Defendant is ordered to pay one-half

of the medical expenses incurred by her as stated in her
Financial Declaration.
7.

Each party is ordered to maintain medical,

dental and optical insurance on the minor children of the
parties if it is available through a group policy at their
place of employment, as a benefit of their employment at
little or no expense and each party is further ordered to pay
one-half of any reasonable and necessary major medical, dental
and/or optical expense incurred for and on behalf of the minor
children which is not covered by a policy of insurance. The
Plaintiff's insurance shall be designated as the primary
carrier.
5
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8.

Each party

is ordered

to pay his or her

respective Court costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
9.

Each parties' Motion for Reconsideration is

hereby denied.
10.

This Amended Decree of Divorce is entered

herein Nunc Pro Tunc, and is retroactive back to the date of
the entry of the original Decree of Divorce on January 18,
1991.
DATED this ^ 4 ^ d a y of /^^n££j^f

, 1992.

"BOYD BJJNNEI^r
r__
Di^fcirictyeourt Judge
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ADDENDUM B
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER ON PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
FROM MODIFICATION HEARING

c , e n ORIGINAL
NOV-U %
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID HIGHT,
)
])
;)

Plaintiff,
Vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
Civil No. 890715978

GLORIA J. HIGHT,
Defendant.

1

Judge Bryner

Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Decree came
on regularly for hearing before the Court on the 2 6th day of
August, 1994, the Honorable BRYCE K. BRYNER, District Court
Judge,

presiding.

Plaintiff

was

personally

present

and

represented by his attorney, JOANE PAPPAS WHITE. Defendant was
personally present and represented by her attorney, HARRY
CASTON. The Court received sworn testimony from the parties,
received certain exhibits into evidence and took the matter
under advisement and now, being fully advised in the premises
the Court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
entered

by

The parties hereto were divorced by
the

January, 1991.

above-entitled

Court

on

the

18th

Decree
day

of

2.

Said Decree of Divorce awarded the Plaintiff

father the legal care and custody of the three

(3) minor

children of the parties, namely, AMANDA ASHLEY HIGHT, born
October 25, 1985; ADAM PARKER HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 and
SHAWN DAVID HIGHT, born June 5, 1987 (twin boys).
3.
Divorce,
HUNDRED

the

At the time of the entry of the Decree of
Defendant

NINETY

had

($990.00)

average

DOLLARS

gross

income

per month.

She

of NINE
now has

monthly gross income of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTYEIGHT ($2,838.00) DOLLARS from her employment with the U.S.
Post Office.
4.

All of Defendant's medical expenses which were

encompassed and contemplated by paragraph 9 of the Findings
of

Fact

have

been

discharged

by

Defendant's

Chapter

7

bankruptcy.
5.

The Court finds that an increase in income of

ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT ($1,848.00) DOLLARS per
month constitutes a material and substantial change in the
conditions of the parties since the time of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce.
6.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is employed

by Sears as a service technician and has monthly gross income
Of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO ($2,532.00) DOLLARS.
7.

Based on the present income of the parties, the

Uniform Child Support Guidelines provide for child support to
be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in the sum of SIX
2
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HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE ($689.00) DOLLARS per month. The only
question remaining to the Court is whether good cause exists
to deviate, at Defendant's request, from the guideline amount.
8.

In analyzing the Defendant's monthly expenses,

the Court finds the following:
A.

The Defendant has no expenses out of the

ordinary, or any types of expenses that have not already been
taken into consideration by the guidelines, except for her
medical expenses of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN
DOLLARS THIRTY-NINE CENTS

($7,867.39). (The total on exhibit

9 should be corrected to $7,867.39 as Gold Cross Ambulance has
been paid off, Pioneer Valley Hospital has been reduced by
$50.00, and 80% of the bills from Dr. Reyser and Consultant
Radiologist will be paid by the insurance company according
to the testimony of the Defendant. The Court also notes that
the bill from University Hospital for $5,543.71 has been
submitted to the Defendants insurance company but it has not
yet been determined whether payment will be made) . She has had
certain home repairs which necessitated a $4,000.00 loan but
the monthly payment thereon of $260.00 is not so out of
proportion to her income that it would, by itself, justify a
deviation from the guidelines.
B.

In arriving at the above findings, the

Court has considered that the Defendant has net income of
EIGHT HUNDRED ($800.00) DOLLARS every two (2) weeks or ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY ($1,720.00) DOLLARS for a 4.3
3
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work week month. She has expenses of TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-FIVE CENTS ($2,102.25) (Exhibit No. 9) and
a TWENTY ($20.00) DOLLAR payment per month to Levitz and a
payment to Signet on the balance of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
($1,200.00) DOLLARS on which no monthly payment was furnished.
C.

The Defendant presented testimony that she

has average medical expenses each month which are not covered
by insurance in the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED NINE

($709.00)

DOLLARS as a result of her schizo-affective bi-polar disorder.
Defendant further stated that this amount was computed by
adding up the face amount of checks she has written in the
past year but Defendant did not provide any documentation to
support her claim.
9.
expenses are

The

Court

finds

extraordinary

that

Defendant's

in light of her

medical

psychological

condition and that it would be unjust to require her to pay
the entire SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE ($689.00) DOLLARS per month
as child support. Accordingly, the Court also finds that the
presumption of correctness of the guideline amount has been
sufficiently rebutted and that Defendant should be required
to pay child support in the amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE
($175.00) DOLLARS per child per month for a total of FIVE
HUNDRED

TWENTY-FIVE

($525.00)

DOLLARS

in

child

support,

commencing with the month of August, 1994.
10.

The

Court

recognizes

that

the

Petition

to

Modify was filed in February of 1994 but also takes into
4

000135

consideration the fact that the Defendant has no savings and
it would be impractical to require her to pay the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS per month since January
of 1994.
11.
per

month

The FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS

in

consideration

child

support

was

determined

after

a

of the factors stated below as required by

Section 78-45-7:
A.

The standard of living and situation of

both parties: The Court finds that the Defendant is living in
a mobile home which she purchased in November of 1993 for
THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($3,500.00) DOLLARS. Substantial
repairs have had to be made on the home which required a FOUR
THOUSAND ($4,000.00) DOLLAR loan. The Defendant is renting the
lot on which the mobile home is situated. The Defendant has
an automobile which is paid for and the Court, therefore,
concludes that she is living a rather austere life style but
one which is adequate. The has been supporting himself and his
three (3) children on his income of approximately TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED ($2,500.00) DOLLARS per month. The Court finds
that his standard of living could not be much different from
that of the Defendant who has actually had more disposable
income than he in the past.
B.

Relative wealth and income of each party:

Each party has regular employment with the Plaintiff earning
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO ($2,532.00) DOLLARS per
5
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month gross income and the Defendant earning TWO THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT ($2,838.00) DOLLARS per month gross
income. Neither party has any substantial savings accounts nor
does either party have any substantial material assets.
C.

Ability of the Defendant to earn: The

Defendant is employed by the U.S. Postal Service where she
earned FORTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($41,500.00) DOLLARS
in 1993 which included overtime. However, at the present time,
she is earning SIXTEEN DOLLARS FIFTY CENTS ($16.50) per hour.
Her employment is secure even though she has been hospitalized
several times in 1991 and in 1994. She has received full pay
during those hospitalizations.
D.

Ability of the Plaintiff to earn: The

Plaintiff is employed by Sears as a service technician. His
employment is secure and should continue for the foreseeable
future. He currently gross income of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
THIRTY-TWO ($2,532.00) DOLLARS per month.
E.

Needs of the parties and the children: The

Plaintiff father has the legal custody of the three (3) minor
children and places them in daycare when they are not in
school while he is at work. His reasonable needs and the needs
of the children exceed his income and he is, therefore, in
need of assistance with child support. The Defendant has needs
each

month

of

ONE

THOUSAND

NINE

HUNDRED

THIRTY-EIGHT

($1,938.00) DOLLARS ($2,122.00 from Exhibit 9 and $709.00 in
child support which has been reduced to $525.00). However, the
6
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Court also finds that the maintenance costs and entertainment
costs appear to be excessive and could be reduced.
F.

The age of the parties: No testimony was

presented with regard to the age of the parties but their
appearance would indicate to the Court that each party is in
their late twenties or early thirties,
G.

Neither party has any responsibility for

the support of others not contemplated by the facts of this
case.
12.

The Defendant should also be required to pay

to the Plaintiff one-half of the actually incurred work
related child care costs as provided by Section 78-45-7.16(1),
Utah Code Annotated. The Court finds that the actually
incurred child care costs are the sum of $400.00 per month at
the current time.
13.

The Defendant shall pay one-half of the out-

of-pocket health insurance premiums for the children. The
Court finds that the premium paid for the children each month
out-of-pocket by the Plaintiff is EIGHTY ($80.00) DOLLARS and
the Defendant should be required to pay one-half of that
amount which is the sum of FORTY ($40.00) DOLLARS pursuant to
Section 78-45-7.15(3), Utah Code Annotated.
14.

The Court finds that an Order to Withhold and

Deliver should be immediately implemented pursuant to Title
62A Chapter 11, Parts IV and V, Utah Code Annotated.

7
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15.

Plaintiff has requested assistance in paying

his attorney fee. Plaintiff's attorney proffered that she has
expended 8 3/4 hours on this case at the rate of ONE HUNDRED
($100.00)

DOLLARS per hour

SEVENTY-FIVE

for a total

of EIGHT HUNDRED

($875.00) DOLLARS. In determining whether to

award an attorney's fee, the Court must consider the financial
need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. The
Court may also consider, among other factors, the difficulty
of

the

litigation,

the efficiency

of

the

attorneys, the

reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, and
the

fee customarily

charged

in the

locality,

the

amount

involved in the case and the result obtained and the expertise
and experience of the attorneys involved. The Court finds, in
this matter, that the Plaintiff has need of assistance in
paying

his

fees; however, the

Court

recognizes

that

the

Defendant, because of her extraordinary medical expenses, can
be expected to pay only a portion of Plaintiff's attorney's
fees in light of the fact that the Plaintiff has prevailed in
this matter. The Court finds that the amount requested is
reasonable in view of the income of the parties and that the
result attained, which was necessary to secure the rights of
the minor children in their child support has been in the best
interests

of

said

children

and

further

finds

that

the

Plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the EIGHT HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE ($875.00) DOLLARS incurred in pursuing this case,
8
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namely, the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN DOLLARS FIFTY
CENTS ($437.50). The Defendant is ordered to pay said sum to
the Plaintiff at the rate of FIFTY ($50.00) DOLLARS per month
commencing with the month of September, 1994 and continuing
each and every month thereafter until said sum has been fully
paid.
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of
Fact now concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
circumstances

A
has

substantial
occurred

and

with

material

respect

to

change
the

of

earning

capacities of the parties since the time of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce and said change justifies a modification of
the Decree of Divorce with respect to child support and other
issues associated therewith.
2.

The

Defendant

is

ordered

to

pay

to

the

Plaintiff child support in the sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE
($175.00) DOLLARS per child per month for a total of FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS per month together with
one-half of the actually incurred child care costs which is
currently the sum of TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS per month
together with one-half of the actually

incurred

insurance

premiums for medical insurance for the children which is the
sum of FORTY ($40.00) DOLLARS per month for a total of SEVEN
HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE
child

($765.00) DOLLARS per month for and as

support pursuant to the Utah Uniform

Child

Support

9
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Guidelines and the attached worksheet attached hereto as
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. Said child
support shall commence with the month of August, 1994 and
shall continue each and every month thereafter until further
order of this Court.
3.

In the event that the Plaintiff experiences any

change in the actually incurred child care expense for his
employment or in the actually incurred medical premiums paid
by him for the benefit of the minor children, he shall
immediately notify the Defendant and any third party agency
such as the Office of Recovery Services, of said change.
4.

The

Defendant

is

ordered

to

pay

to

the

Plaintiff the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN DOLLARS FIFTY
CENTS ($437.50) for and as a portion of Plaintiff's attorney's
fees in this matter. Defendant shall pay said sum to the
Plaintiff at the rate of FIFTY ($50.00) DOLLARS per month
commencing with the month of September, 1994 and continuing
each and every month thereafter until said sum has been fully
^6

paid.
DATED this /

day of Oe^fetniibtf-r, 1994.

BRYCE y. BRYN
District Court Jud
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Attorney Bar No.

3445
IN THE Seventh
Carbon

DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID HIGHT

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORK,
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERN!

VS.

GLORIA J . HIGHT,

C i v i l No.

8907159.78

FATHER

MOTHER

COMB I

j 1. Enter the £ of natural and adopted children of this ///////////
j|mccr.er and father for wncm support is _to be awarded.
///////////

///////////

2a. Inter the father's and mother's gross monthly
(income. Refer to Instructions for definition of
II income.

s

S

III

ii nun

j 2b. Inter previously ordered alimony that is actually 1 caid.
(So*net enter aiimonv ordered for this case).

-

i

1 2c. Inter previously ordered child support. (Do not
|| enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1 ) .

-

-

-

| 2d. OPTIONAL; Inter the amount from Line 12 of the
IIChildren in Present Heme Worksheet for either parent.

1 2. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the5
2838
[Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes.
j of cniidren in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the
S|Hase Ccmoir.ec Support Qbiicaticn. Inter it here.
IE. livice eacn parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line
|2 bv the COMBINED adjusted monthly cross in Line 3.

S

53

S

'2532

///////////
///////////
///////////

/////mm
milium
47

1_611

%

5370

S

///////////

%

6. Multiply Line 4 by Line S for each parent to obtain S
689
|eacn parent's share of the 3ase Support Obligation.

///////

mini
nnm
mini
mi m
mini
mini
limn
mini

2532

2838

3

1300

mini,
mm i.

_ IIIIIII,
mini,

7 . 3ASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD:
B r i n g down t h e amount i n L i n e 6
f o r t h e O b l i g o r P a r e n t o r e n t e r t h e amount frcra t h e Low Income
Table.

3.

Which parent is the obligor?

a0

Is the support award ordered different from the guideline amount in Line 7?
(X) Yes Y ) No
If YES, enter the amount ordered: $175 p e r child total

10,

What
( )
( }
( )

( XJ Mother

( ) Father

were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
property settlement
excessive debts of the marriage
aosence of need of the custodial parent

$525

ORIGINAL
fir

rf

?f

u

NOV-* %
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID HIGHT,
Plaintiff,
Vs.

)
;|
]

ORDER ON PETITION FOR
MODIFICATION
Civil No. 890715978

GLORIA J. HIGHT,
Defendant.

1

Judge Bryner

Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Decree came
on regularly for hearing before the Court on the 26th day of
August, 1994, the Honorable BRYCE K. BRYNER, District Court
Judge,

presiding.

Plaintiff

was

personally

present

and

represented by his attorney, JOANE PAPPAS WHITE. Defendant was
personally present and represented by her attorney, HARRY
CASTON. The Court received sworn testimony from the parties,
received certain exhibits into evidence and took the matter
under advisement and now, being fully advised in the premises
and the Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:

000204

1.
circumstances

A

substantial

has

occurred

and

with

material

respect

to

change
the

of

earning

capacities of the parties since the time of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce and said change justifies a modification of
the Decree of Divorce with respect to child support and other
issues associated therewith.
2.

The

Defendant

is

ordered

to

pay

to

the

Plaintiff child support in the sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE
($175.00) DOLLARS per child per month for a total of FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($525.00) DOLLARS per month together with
one-half of the actually incurred child care costs which is
currently the sum of TWO HUNDRED ($200.00) DOLLARS per month
together with one-half of the actually

incurred

insurance

premiums for medical insurance for the children which is the
sum of FORTY ($40.00) DOLLARS per month for a total of SEVEN
HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE
child

($765.00) DOLLARS per month for and as

support pursuant to the Utah Uniform

Guidelines

and

the attached

worksheet

Child

attached

Support

hereto

as

Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. Said child
support shall commence with the month of August, 1994 and
shall continue each and every month thereafter until further
order of this Court.
3.

In the event that the Plaintiff experiences any

change in the actually incurred child care expense for his
employment or in the actually incurred medical premiums paid
by

him

for the benefit

of the minor

children, he

shall

2
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immediately notify the Defendant and any third party agency
such as the Office of Recovery Services, of said change.
4.

The

Defendant

is

ordered

to

pay

to

the

Plaintiff the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN DOLLARS FIFTY
CENTS ($437.50) for and as a portion of Plaintiff's attorney's
fees in this matter. Defendant shall pay said sum to the
Plaintiff at the rate of FIFTY ($50.00) DOLLARS per month
commencing with the month of September, 1994 and continuing
each and every month thereafter until said sum has been fully
paid.
DATED this

7

day of SPdfefflPSI / 1994
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Attorney Bar No.

3445
IN THE

Seventh

Carbon

DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID HIGHT

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS:
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNI r

VS.
GLORIA J .

HIGHT,

C i v i l No.
MOTHER

890715978

FATHER

COMBIN

11. Enter the £ of natural and adopted children of this /////////// ///////////
3
|| mother and father for whom support is to be awarded. /////////// ///////////
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly
5
S
am 11!
income. Refer to Instructions for definition of
2838
2532
II income.
III////!
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually IIIIIIII
II paid. (Do net enter alimony ordered for this easel.
II11111!

mum

2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not
(I enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1).

-

| 2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the
||Children in Present Heme Worksheet for either parent.

-

-

| 2. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the
(Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes.

S

4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number
cf cnildren in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the
|3ase Comoined Support Obligation. Enter it here.

/////////// /////////// S
/////////// ///////////
1300
/////////// ///////////

IIII
S

53

S

'2532

2838

5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line
|2 by -he COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain
[eacn parent's share of the 3ase Support Obligation.

IIIIIIII
IIIIIIII
IIIIIIII

%

s

47
5

689

611

%

III!

5370

IIIIIIII.
IIIIIIII
IIIIIIII.

IIIJJJjL

7 . 3ASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD:
3 r i n g down t h e amount i n L i n e 6
f o r t h e O b l i g o r P a r e n t o r e n t e r t h e a m o u n t from t h e Low Income
Table.

a.

Which p a r e n t i s t h e o b l i g o r ?

Q

I s t h e s u p p o r t award ordered d i f f e r e n t from t h e g u i d e l i n e amount i n Line 7?
(X) Yes X ) X°
-* - - s ' e " l e r t h e amount o r d e r e d : $ 1 7 5 p e r c h i l d t o t a l

#

10.

( X) Mother

( ) Father
$525

What were t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d by t h e Court f o r t h e d e v i a t i o n ?
( ) property settlement
( ) e x c e s s i v e d e b t s of t h e m a r r i a g e
( ) a o s e n c e of need of t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t
(X) o t h e r :
E x t r a o r d i n a r y mfi^nal pxppnsps
r\ n n r\ f\ O

INSURANCE PREMIUM AND CHILD CARE ADJUSTMENT
WORKSHEET
INSURANCE ADJUSTMENT
L'se this section of the worksheet to calculate how the children's
.T.eciical insurance premium expenses change the amount the obligor pays to
-he ooliaee.

If t h e OBLIGCR parent i s ordered to maintain medical insurance for t h e
c h i l d r e n comnlete t h i s s e c t i o n .
;|A. Enter the amount of the children's portion of the medical
' insurance oremium actually oaid bv the obiioor.
il
:
— :
:
:
.
1 3. Multiply Line A. by .30 to oDtam tne obligee's share of the
I oremium.
L_r
_ ,
._._______________
C Subtract the amount in line 3. from the base cnild.. support award
to obtain the amount the obligor pays to the obligee for the months
tne premium is actually paid. Enter the result here.

$ ~

~

i

||

$

I

5

il!
i

I

:he OBLIGEE parent i s ordered t o maintain medicai insurance for the
.dren complete t h i s s e c t i o n .
the c h i l d r e n ' s t o r t i o n of t n e medical
i t e r tne amount
insurance oremium a c t u a i i v oaid bv t h e o b l i c e e .
Multiply L ine D. bv .30 to obtain the obligor's share of the
smium.
r. naa tne amount .n line 2. to the base child support award to
obtain the amount :he obligor pays to the obligee for the months the
oremium is actual 1'.• oaid. Inter the result here.

80
40
729

Mc credit or offset is allowed unless the premium is actually paid. If
the premium is net paid, the obligor must pay the amount of the case
child support award.
CHILD CARE ADJUSTMENT
Use this section of the worksheet to calculate how the children's child
care exoenses chance the amount the obliaor oavs to the oblicee.
G. Inter the average amount of the monthly child care expense
actuaiiv oaid bv the oblicee.

400

H. Multiply Line G. by .30 to obtain the obligor's share of the child
care expense. Inter the result here. Complete box I, J, or K. below.

200

I. If neither parent is maintaining insurance, add the amount in Line
H. to the base child support award to obtain the amount the obligor
pays to the obligee for the months the child care expense is
incurred. Inter the resuit here.
the ooliccr is maintaining insurance, add the amount m Line H.
to tne amount m line C. to obtain the amount :he obligor pays to the
coiigee for the months he cnna care exoense .s incurred. Inter the
resuit here.
K. If tne coiicee .s maintaining insurance, add the amount in Line H.
to :ne amount m line F. to obtain the amount the obligor pays to the
cbiigee for the montns the child care expense is incurred. Inter the
resuit nere.
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ADDENDUM C
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID HIGHT

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID HIGHT
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID HIGHT

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, ::
:

Case No. 940721-CA

::

GLORIA J. HIGHT

Priority 15

Defendant/Appellant.:
I, David Hight, being first duly sworn upon oath,
hereby depose and state as follows:
1.

I

was

Plaintiff

in

the

divorce

action,

Petitioner in the modification procedure and Appellee in
the current matter.
2.

At all times since the entry of the Decree of

Divorce on January

18, 1991, I have been the sole

custodian of our three (3) children Amanda Ashley Hight,
born October 25, 1985; Adam Parker Hight, born June 5,
1987; and Shawn David Hight, born June 5, 1987.
3.

On February 9, 1994 I filed the Petition for

Modification

concerning

child

support

because

I

discovered that my ex-wife, Gloria Hight, had been fully
re-employed as a postal worker at the United States Post
Office for over a year.
4.

Although she had been fully employed at an

income over $40,000.00, Gloria had failed to provide any
child support whatsoever for our children nor had she
advised me of her ability to do so.
5.

Following the entry of the Order on Petition

for Modification, Gloria has failed to pay any of the

child support ordered by the Court. She has additionally
failed to provide any of the attorney's fees awarded to
me in the modification proceeding. She has also failed to
pay any of the child care costs or any of the medical
expenses as required by the Order of Modification or the
Decree of Divorce, respectively.
6.

After

Modification,

the

filing

Gloria made

one

of

the

Petition

(1) voluntary

for

$10.00

payment of child support. Office of Recovery Services
made one (1) garnishment of Gloria's taxes for $300.00
after the commencement of the Petition for Modification.
Since the filing of the appeal, the Office of Recovery
Services has advised me that they will not attempt any
further child support collection activities until the
appeal is resolved.
7.

Following the entry of the Court's Order on

Petition for Modification on November 4, 1995, Gloria
called me at 6:38 p.m. on November 16, 1995. She informed
me that she would appeal this matter before she would pay
the child support or attorney's fees. She advised me that
she would voluntarily agree to pay $100.00 per child per
month and if that wasn't enough she v/ould just quit her
employment and never pay anything and appeal the case. I
took notes on the conversation and believe she meant what
she said.

2

8.

My income has increased by only $125.00 per

month since the time of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce in 1991. The needs of the minor children have
increased substantially due to the increase in their ages
and the cost of living.
9.

The minor children and I are really having a

financial struggle to meet the costs and attorney's fees
of this appeal. My attorney has advanced all of the costs
on this case and I am attempting to make a modest monthly
payment toward the attorney's fees; however, this appeal
is causing a substantial hardship to the children as it
is expending monies that we do not have available to us.
10.

In my opinion, Gloria knows the hardship that

the children and I are experiencing as a result of this
appeal and it was the basis of her threat to pursue the
appeal if I would not accept her terms and conditions.
WHEREFORE, Affiant prays that the Court determine
that Appellant's appeal is without merit and has been
filed for the sole purpose of causing a delay in the
collection of Appellant's child support obligations and
causing

serious

financial

distress

to

the Affiant.

Affiant asks that this Court remand this matter to the
Trial Court for an award of Affiant's Court costs and
attorney's fees.

3

J
DATED this

1%

day of May, 1995.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
May, 1995,

yUOTARY^ PUBLIC

ur

fy&fis*

Residing At:

My Commission Expires;

^

4

^

day of

ADDENDUM D
SECTION 78-45-1 ET. SEQ.,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

JUDICIAL CODE

375

78-44-39. Duties under prior law — Property to
be included in initial report.
(1) This chapter does not relieve a holder of a duty
to report, pay, or deliver property arising before July
1, 1983. Such holder who fails to comply before that
date is subject to the applicable enforcement and penalty provisions in existence at that time and those
provisions are continued in effect for the purpose of
this subsection, subject to Subsection 78-44-30(2).
(2) The initial report to be filed under this chapter
for property that was not required to be reported before July 1, 1983, but which is subject to this chapter
shall include all items of property that would have
been presumed abandoned during the ten-year period
prior to July 1, 1983. as if this chapter had been in
effect during that period.
1983
78-44-40.

Application and construction of chapter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law with respect to the subject of this chapter among
states enacting it.
1983
CHAPTER 45
U N I F O R M CIVIL LIABILITY FOR S U P P O R T
ACT
Section
78-45-1.
78-45-2.
78-45-3.
78-45-4.
78-45-4.1.

78-45-4.2.
78-45-4.3.
78-45-5.
78-45-6.
78-45-7.
78-45-7.1.

78-45-7.2.
78-45-7.3.
78-45-7.4.
78-45-7.5.
78-45-7.6.
78-45-7.7.
78-45-7.8.
78-45-7.9.
78-45-7.10.
78-45-7.11.
78-45-7.12.
78-45-7.13.
78-45-7.14.

Short title.
Definitions.
Duty of man.
Duty of woman.
Duty of stepparent to support stepchild — Effect of termination of
marriage or common law relationship.
Natural or adoptive parent has primary obligation of support r— Right
of stepparent to recover support.
Ward of state — Primary obligation to
support.
Duty of obligor regardless of presence
or residence of obligee.
District court jurisdiction.
Determination of amount of support
— Rebuttable guidelines.
Medical expenses of dependent children — Assigning responsibility for
payment — Insurance coverage —
Income withholding.
Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation.
Obligation — Adjusted gross income
used.
Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
Adjusted gross income.
Calculation of obligations.
Split custody — Obligation calculations.
Joint physical custody — Obligation
calculations.
Reduction when child becomes 18.
Reduction for extended visitation.
Income in excess of tables.
Advisory committee — Membership
and functions.
Base combined child support obligation table and low income table.

Section
78-45-7.15.
78-45-7.16.
78-45-7.17.
78-45-7.18.
78-45-7.19.
78-45-7.20.
78-45-7.21.
78-45-8.
78-45-9.
78-45-9.1.
78-45-9.2.
78-45-10.
78-45-11.
78-45-12.
78-45-13.

78-45-2
Medical expenses.
Child care expenses — Expenses not
incurred.
Child care costs.
Limitation on amount of support ordered.
Determination of parental liability.
Accountability of support provided to
benefit child — Accounting.
Award of tax exemption for dependent
children.
Continuing jurisdiction.
Enforcement of right of support.
Repealed.
County attorney to assist obligee.
Appeals.
Husband and wife privileged communication inapplicable — Competency of spouses.
Rights are in addition to those presently existing.
Interpretation and construction.

78-45-1. Short title.
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability
for Support Act.
1957
78-45-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 78-45-7.6(1).
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office
of Recovery Services.
(3) "Base child support award" means the
award that may be ordered and is calculated
using the guidelines before additions for medical
expenses and work-related child care costs.
(4) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support table," "base child support
obligation table," "low income table," or "table"
means the appropriate table in Section 78-457.14.
(5) "Child" means a son or daughter younger
than 18 years of age and a son or daughter of any
age who is incapacitated from earning a living
and is without sufficient means.
(6) "Court" means the district court, juvenile
court, or administrative agency which may enter
a child support order as defined in Section
62A-11-401.
(7) "Earnings" means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant to pension or retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings specifically includes all gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion
of capital assets.
(8) "Guidelines" means the child support
guidelines in Sections 78-45-7.2 through 78-457.21.
(9) "IV-D" means Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq.
(10) "Joint physical custody" means the child
stays with each parent overnight for more than
25% of the year, and both parents contribute to
the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support.
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(11) "Medical expenses" means health and
dental expenses and related insurance costs.
(12) "Obligee" means any person to whom a
duty of support is owed.
(13) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty
of support.
(14) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services.
(15) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an
adoptive parent, or a stepparent.
(16) "Split custody" means that each parent
has physical custody of at least one of the children.
(17) "State" includes any state, territory, or
possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.
(18) "Stepchild" means any child having a
stepparent.
(19) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or
adoptive parent or a person living with the natural or adoptive parent as a common law spouse,
whose common law marriage was entered into in
this state under Section 30-1-4.5 or in any other
state which recognizes the validity of common
law marriages.
(20) "Work-related child care costs" means
reasonable child care costs for up to a full-time
work week or training schedule as necessitated
by the employment or training of the custodial
parent under Section 78-45-7.17.
(21) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid
in calculating the base child support award. 1994
78-45-3. D u t y of m a n .
Every father shall support his child; and every man
shall support his wife when she is in need.
- 1991
78-45-4. D u t y o f w o m a n .
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall
support her husband when he is in need.
1957
78-45-4.1. D u t y o f stepparent t o support stepchild — Effect of termination of marriage or c o m m o n l a w relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required to
support a child. Provided, however, that upon the termination of the marriage or common law relationship
between the stepparent and the child's natural or
adoptive parent the support obligation shall terminate.
1980
78-45-4.2.

Natural or adoptive p a r e n t has prim a r y obligation of s u p p o r t — Right of
s t e p p a r e n t to r e c o v e r support.
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has the
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the
natural or adoptive parent as any other obligee. 1979
78-45-4.3.

Ward of state — Primary obligation to

support.
Notwithstanding Section 78-45-2, a natural or an
adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child has
become a ward of the state is not relieved of the primary obligation to support that child until he reaches
the age of majority.
1983
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78-45-5. D u t y o f obligor r e g a r d l e s s o f p r e s e n c e
or residence of obligee.
An obligor present or resident in this state has the
duty of support as defined in this act regardless of the
presence or residence of the obligee.
1957
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction.
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under this act.
1957
78-45-7. Determination of a m o u n t o f support —
Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the
amount granted by prior court order unless there
has been a material change of circumstance on
the part of the obligor or obligee.
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the automatic adjustment for
prospective support, the prospective support shall
be the amount as stated in the order, without a
showing of a material change of circumstances, if
the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or
exceeds the base child support award required by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as
a result of the obligor's voluntary reduction
of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material
change in circumstances has occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall
require each party to file a proposed award of child
support using the guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may
be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut
the guidelines, the court shall establish support after
considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and
the child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the
obligee for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court
shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon
the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in
this chapter.
1994
78-45-7.1. Medical e x p e n s e s o f d e p e n d e n t children — Assigning responsibility for
payment — Insurance coverage — Income withholding.
The court shall include the following in its order:
( D a provision assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical expenses for the dependent children;
(2) a provision requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate insurance for the
medical expenses of dependent children, if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost;
(3) provisions* for income withholding, in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and
5; and
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(4) with regard to child support orders issued
or modified on or after January 1, 1994, that are
subject to income withholding, an order assessing
against the obligor an additional $7 per month
check processing fee to be included in the amount
withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services
for the purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5.
1994

78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an award of
child support entered on or after July 1. 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing
or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the use of
worksheets consistent with these guidelines are
presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the
provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the
record supporting the conclusion that complying with
a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a
child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that parent and are
not children in common to both parties may at
the option of either party be taken into account
under the guidelines in setting or modifying a
child support award, as provided in Subsection
(5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared
that compute the obligations of the respective
parents for the additional children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before determining the
award in the instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award,
consideration of natural or adoptive children other
than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be
applied to justify a decrease in the award.
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment
of the guidelines and any subsequent change in the
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material
change of circumstances as a ground for modification
or adjustment of a court order, if there is a difference
of a t least 2 5 % between the existing order and the
guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq.,
the office may request modification, in accordance
with t h e requirements of the Family Support Act of
1988, Public Law 100-485, no more often than once
every t h r e e years.
1994
78-45-7.3.

P r o c e d u r e — Documentation — Stipulation.
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the
moving p a r t y shall submit:

(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and

78-45-7.5

(c) a written statement indicating whether or
not the amount of child support requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by
the moving party, based on the best evidence
available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and
may only be offered after a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in an administrative proceeding.
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii) the financial verification required by
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(iii) a written statement indicating
whether or not the amount of child support
requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall be used to review the adequacy of a
child support order negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or
combined child support and alimony is adequate
under the guidelines if the stipulated child support a m o u n t or combined amount equals or exceeds t h e base child support award required by
the guidelines.
1994
78-45-7.4.

Obligation — Adjusted g r o s s i n c o m e
used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating
each parent's share of the base combined child support obligation. Only income of the n a t u r a l or adoptive parents of the child may be used to determine the
award under these guidelines.
1994
78-45-7.5.

Determination of g r o s s i n c o m e — Imp u t e d income.

(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions,
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone,
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, disability insurance
benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested"
government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited
to the equivalent of one full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy
program, the Job Training Partnership Act,
S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits
received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by
subtracting necessary expenses required for selfemployment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-em-
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ployment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross
income available to the parent to satisfy a child
support award Only those expenses necessary to
allow the business to operate at a reasonable
level mav be deducted from gross receipts
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection mav differ from the amount of business
income determined for tax purposes
(5) (a) When possible gross income should first be
computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of
current income Each parent shall provide yearto-date pa\ stuDs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returns from at least the
most recent \ ear unless the court finds the verification is not reasonablv available Verification of
income from records maintained by the Office of
Emplovment Secuntv ma\ be substituted for pay
stubs, emplo\er statements and income tax returns
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be
used to determine whether an underemployment
or overemplovment situation exists
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the
parent under Subsection (7)
(7) (a) Income mav not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is \oluntarih unemployed or underemploved
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential
and probable earnings as denved from work history occupation qualifications, and prevailing
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds m
the communitv
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week To impute
a greater income the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as
to the evidentiarv basis for the imputation
(d) Income mav not be imputed if any of the
following conditions exist
d) the reasonable costs of child care for
the parents minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn,
(n) a parent is phvsically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum
wage
(in) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills,
or
dv) unusual emotional or physical needs
of a child require the custodial parent s presence in the home
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings
of a child who is the subject of a child support
award nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right such as Supplemental Security Income
(b) Social Secuntv benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited
as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount
against the potential obligation of that parent
Other unearned income of a child may be consid-
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ered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case
1994
78-45-7.6. Adjusted g r o s s i n c o m e .
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the amount calculated by subtracting from
gross income alimony previously ordered and paid
and child support previously ordered
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the
parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding In establishing alimony, the court shall consider
that in determining the child support, the guidelines
do not provide a deduction from gross income for alimony
1989
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted
gross incomes, unless the low income table is applicable
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and
split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2 and in
cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is
$1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award
shall be determined as follows
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base combined child
support obligation table
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is between $650 and $1,050, the
base child support award shall be the lesser of the
amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2)
and the amount calculated using the low income table
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined child support obligations for up
to six children For more than six children, additional
amounts may be added to the base child support obligation shown Unless rebutted by Subsection
78-45-7 2(3), the amount ordered shall not be less
than the amount which would be ordered for up to six
children
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is $649 or less, the court or administrative
agency shall determine the amount of the child support obligation en a case-by-case basis, but the base
child support award shall not be less than $20
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support
amount for the total number of children, not an
amount per child
1994
78-45-7.8.

SplH c u s t o d y — Obligation calcula-

tions.
In cases of split custody, the base child support
award shall be determined as follows
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base combined child
support obligation table Allocate a portion of the
calculated amount between the parents in proportion to the number of children for whom each
parent has physical custody The amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support obligation due each parent from the other parent for
support of the child or children for whom each
parent has physical custody
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(2) Multiply the tentative base child support
obligation due each parent by the percentage
that the other parent's adjusted gross income
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income
of both parents.
(3) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection
(2) from the larger amount to determine the base
child support award to be paid by the parent with
the greater financial obligation.
1994

78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation
calculations.
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child
support award shall be determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base combined child
support obligation table.
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support obligation by multiplying the base combined child support obligation by each parent's percentage of
combined adjusted gross income. The amounts so
calculated are a tentative base child support obligation due from each parent for support of the
children.
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child
support obligation by the percentage of time the
children spend with the other parent to determine each parent's tentative obligation to the
other parent.
(4) Calculate the base child support award to
be paid by the obligor by subtracting the lesser
amount calculated in Subsection (3) from the
larger amount.
(5) The parent determined to be the obligor in
Subsection (4) shall pay the amount calculated in
Subsection (4) when the obligee has physical custody.
1994
78-45-7.10.

R e d u c t i o n w h e n child b e c o m e s 18.

(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has
graduated from high school during the child's normal
and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs
later, the base child support award is automatically
reduced to reflect the lower base combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support order.

78-45-7.12. I n c o m e in e x c e s s of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate
and just child support amount shall be ordered on a
case-by-case basis, b u t the amount ordered may not
be less t h a n t h e highest level specified in the table for
the number of children due support.
1994
78-45-7.13.

R e d u c t i o n for e x t e n d e d visitation.

(1) The child support order shall provide that the
base child support award be reduced by 50% for each
child for time periods during which the child is with
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by
written agreement of the parties for at least 25 of any
30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any
agreement by the parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be approved by
the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall
not be considered an interruption of the consecutive
day requirement.
(2) For purposes of this section the per child
amount to which the abatement applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by
the number of children included in the award.
1994

A d v i s o r y committee — Membership

and functions.
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, and every fourth
year subsequently, the governor shall appoint an advisory committee consisting of:
(a) two representatives recommended by the
Office of Recovery Services;
(b) two representatives recommended by the
Judicial Council;
(c) two representatives recommended by the
Utah State Bar Association; and
(d) an uneven number of additional persons,
not to exceed five, who represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor may consider appropriate. However, none of
the individuals appointed under this subsection
may be members of the Utah State Bar Association.
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the
child support guidelines to ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate
child support award amounts.
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim Committee on or before
October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before October 1 of every fourth year subsequently.
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the majority of the committee, as
well as specific recommendations of individual
members of the committee.
(3) The committee members serve without compensation. Staff for t h e committee shall be provided from
the existing budgets of the Department of H u m a n
Services and t h e Judicial Council. The committee
ceases to exist no later t h a n the date the subsequent
committee u n d e r this section is appointed.
1994
78-45-7.14.

B a s e c o m b i n e d child support obliga-

tion table and low income table.
The following includes the Base Combined Child
Support Obligation Table and the Low Income Table:
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION TABLE
(Both Parents)

(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child
amount derived from the base child support award
originally ordered.
1994
78-45-7.11.

78-45-7.14

Monthly
Combined
Adj. Gross
Income
1

Number of
Children
3
4

2

5

6
6

1
From
650
676
701
726
751
776
801
826
851
876
901
926
951
976
1,001

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

2

3

4

5

To
675
700
725
750
775
800
825
850
875
900
925
950
975
1.000
1,050

99
103
106
110
113
117
121
124
128
132
135
139
143
146
154

184
190
197
204
211
218
224
231
238
245
251
258
265
272
285

191
198
205
212
219
226
243
253
263
274
284
294
305
315
335

198
205
212
220
227
234
261
275
289
303
316
330
344
358
385

200
207
214
221
229
236
263
277
291
305
319
333
347
361
389

201
209
216
223
231
238
265
279
294
308
322
336
350
364
393
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78-45-7.15
Monthly
Combined
Adj. Gross
Income
1.051 —
1.101 —
1,151 —
1.201 1.251 —
1.301 —
1,351 —
1.401 —
1.451 —
1.501 —
1.551 —
1.601 —
1.651 1.701 —
1.751 —
1.801 —
1.851 —
1.901 —
1.951 2.001 —
2.101 —
2.201 —
2.301 —
2.401 —
2.501 —
2,601 —
2.701 —
2.801 —
2.901 —
3.001 —
3.101 —
3.201 —
3.301 —
3.401 —
3.501 —
3.601 —
3.701 —
3.801 —
3.901 —
4.001 —
4.101 —
4.201 —
4.301 —
4.401 —
4,501 —
4.601 —
4.701 —
4.801 —
4.901 —
5.001 —
5.101 —
5.201 —
5.301 —
5.401 —
5,501 —
5.601 —
5.701 —
5.801 —
5.901 —
6.001 —
6,101 —
6,201 —
6.301 —
6.401 —
6.501 —
6.601 —
6/701
6.801 —
6.901 —
7.001 —
7,101 —
7.201 —
7,301 —
7,401 —
7,501 —
7.601 —
7,701 —
7,801 —
7.901 —
8.001 —
8,101 —
8,201 —
8.301 —
8,401 —
8.501 —
8,601 —
8.701 —

1.100
1.150
1.200
1.250
1.300
1.350
1.400
1.450
1.500
1.550
1.600
1.650
1.700
1.750
1.800
1.850
1.900
1.950
2.000
2.100
2.200
2.300
2.400
2.500
2.600
2.700
2.800
2.900
3.000
3.100
3.200
3.300
3.400
3.500
3.600
3.700
3.800
3.900
4.000
4.100
4.200
4.300
4.400
4.500
4.600
4.700
4.800
4.900
5.000
5.100
5.200
5.300
5.400
5.500
5.600
5.700
5.800
5.900
6.000
6.100
6.200
6.300
6.400
6.500
6.600
6.700
6.800
6.900
7.000
7.100
7.200
7.300
7.400
7.500
7.600
7.700
7,800
7,900
8,000
8.100
8.200
8,300
8.400
8.500
8.600
8,700
8.800

1

2

161
168
176
183
190
198
205
212
220
227
234
242
249
256
264
271
278
286
293
308
319
328
336
345
354
362
371
380
388
397
406
414
423
431
438
444
451
458
465
472
479
486
493
499
506
513
520
527
534
541
547
554
561
568
575
582
586
591
596
601
605
610
615
620
624
629
629
673
680
687
694
701
706
710
715
719
723
728
732
737
741
746
750
755
759
763
768

299
313
326
340
353
367
381
394
408
421
435
449
462
476
489
503
517
530
544
571
592
608
625
641
658
674
691
707
724
740
756
773
789
804
817
830
843
856
870
883
896
909
923
936
949
962
975
989
1,002
1,015
1,028
1.042
1.055
1.068
1.081
1,093
1,103
1.112
1,122
1,131
1,141
1,150
1,159
1,169
1,178
1,188
1,188
U88
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,189
1.197
1,205
1,213
1,220
1,228
1,236
1,244
1,252
1,259
1,267
1,275
1,283
1,291
1,298

Number of
Children
3
356
377
387
403
418
433
448
463
478
493
509
524
539
554
569
584
597
610
622
643
666
687
708
725
746
767
788
809
830
851
872
893
914
934
953
973
992
1.012
1.031
1.050
1,069
1.088
1,107
1.131
1,150
1.169
1,188
1,207
1.226
1,245
1.264
1,282
1.300
1.317
1,335
1.351
1.367
1.383
1,398
1,414
1.430
1,445
1,461
1.480
1,495
1,511
1.511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,520
1.531
1,541
1,551
1.562
1,572
1,582
1,592
1,603
1,613
1,623
1.633
1.644
1,654
1,664
1,675

380

Monthly
Combined
Adj. Gross
Income
4

5

6

413
441
449
465
482
499
515
532
549
565
582
599
615
632
649
664
677
690
700
716
741
766
791
809
834
859
885
910
936
962
987
1,013
1,039
1.064
1.090
1,116
1.141
1,167
1,192
1.217
1.242
1,267
1,292
1,326
1,350
1,375
1,400
1.425
1,450
1,475
1,500
1,522
1.544
1.566
1,588
1,610
1,632
1.653
1,675
1,697
1,719
1,740
1,762
1,791
1,812
1,834
1,834
1334
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,841
1.853
1,864
1,876
1,887
1,899
1,911

417
444
454
475
496
516
537
558
579
600
620
641
662
683
704
723
736
750
752
779
807
835
862
882
909
937
964
992
1,020
1,048
1.076
1,103
1,131
1,159
1,187
1,215
1,243
1,270
1,297
1,325
1.352
1.379
1,407
1,443
1,470.
1,498
1,525
1,552
1,580
1,607
1,634
1,658
1,682
1,706
1,730
1,754
1,778
1,802
1,826
1,850
1,874
1,897
1,921
1,951
1,975
1.998
1,998
1^998
1,998
1,998
1.998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1.998
1,998
1,998
1,998
2,000
2.013
2,026
2,039
2,052
2,064
2,077
2,090
2,103

421
449
460
484
508
532
556
580
605
629
653
677
701
725
749
771
786
800
813
833
862
891
921
942
972
1,001
1,031
1,060
1,090
1,120
1,149
1,179
1,208
1,238
1,268
1,297
1,327
1,356
1,386
1,415
1,444
1,474
1,503
1,541
1,570
1,600
1,629
1,658
1,687
1,717
1,746
1,772
1,797
1,823
1,848
1,874
1,899
1,925
1,950
1,976
2,001
2,026
2,052
2,084
2,109
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,137
2,150
2,164
2,178
2,192
2.206
2,220
2,234
2,247
2.261

1
8.801
8,901
9,001
9,101
9.201
9,301
9,401
9,501
9,601
9,701
9,801
9,901
10,001

— 8,900
— 9,000
— 9,100
— 9,200
— 9,300
— 9.400
— 9,500
— 9,600
— 9.700
— 9.800
— 9,900
— 10.000
— 10,100

772
777
781
786
790
795
799
803
808
812
817
821
826

2

Number of
Children
3

1,306
1,314
1,322
1,330
1.337
1,345
1.353
1,361
1,369
1.376
1,384
1,392
1,400

1,685
1,695
1,705
1,716
1,726
1,736
1,747
1,757
1,767
1,777
1,788
1,798
1,808

4

5

6

1.922
1,934
1,945
1,957
1.969
1.980
1,992
2.003
2.015
2,027
2.038
2,050
2,061

2.116
2.129
2.141
2,154
2.167
2.180
2,193
2.206
2.218
2.231
2.244
2.257
2.270

2,275
2,289
2,303
2,317
2,330
2,344
2,358
2,372
2,386
2,400
2,414
2,427
2,441

4

5

6

23
47
70
93
116
140
163
186
209
233
256
279
302
326
372

24
47
71
94
118
141
165
188
212
235
259
282
306
329
376

24
48
71
95
119
143
166
190
214
238
261
285
309
333
380
1994

LOW INCOME TABLE
(Obligor Parent Only)
Monthly
Adj. Gross
Income
1
From
650
676
701
726
751
776
801
826
851
876
901
926
951
976
1,001

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Number of
Children
3

2

To
675
700
725
750
775
800
825
850
875
900
925
950
975
1,000
1,050

23
45
68
90
113

23
46
68
91
114
137
159
182
205
228
250

23
46
69
92
115
138
161
184
207
230
253
276
299

78-45-7.15. Medical expenses.
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the
medical <
expenses of the minor children be provided
by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost.
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to
maintainL insurance for medical expenses.the court or
administrative acrencv
mav
„ consider
.
the>•
w
(a) reasonableness of the cost;
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(O coverage of the policy; and
(d) preference of the custodial parent.
(3) The order shall require each parent to share
equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid bv a parent for the children's Dortion of insurance.
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per
capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense ifor the children shall be calculated by
dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the
result by the number of children in the instant case.
(5) The order shall require each parent to share
equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments,
incurred for the dependent children and actually paid
by the parents
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall
provide verification of coverage to the other parent,
or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq.,
upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or
the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the
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Social Security Act, 42 U S C Section 601 et seq , of
any change of insurance earner, premium, or benefits
within 30 calendar davs of the date he first knew or
should have known of the change
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall
provide written verification of the cost and payment
of medical expenses to the other parent within 30
da>s of payment
(8) In addition to an\ other sanctions provided by
the court a parent incurring medical expenses may
be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses
or to recover the other parent s share of the expenses
if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (6) and
(7)

1994

78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not
incurred.
(1) The child support order shall require that each
parent share equallv the reasonable work-related
child care expenses of the parents
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred a parent shall begin paying his share on a
monthlv basis immediatelv upon presentation of
proof of the child care expense, but if the child
care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent
may suspend making monthly payment of that
expense while it is not being incurred, without
obtaining a modification of the child support order
(b) d) In the absence of a court order to the
contrarv a parent who incurs child care expense shall provide written verification of
the cost and identity of a child care provider
to the other parent upon initial engagement
of a provider and thereafter on the request of
the other parent
(n) In the absence of a court order to the
contrary, the parent shall notify the other
parent of anv change of child care provider
or the monthlv expense of child care within
30 calendar davs of the date of the change
(3) In addition to am other sanctions provided by
the court, a parent incurring child care expenses may
be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses
or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses
if the parent incurring the expenses fails to comply
with Subsection (2Kb)
1994
78-45-7.17. Child care costs.
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child
support order is presumed, if the custodial parent or
the noncustodial parent during extended visitation,
is working and actuallv incurring the child care costs
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be awarded on a case-by-case basis, if
the costs are related to the career or occupational
training of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the interest of justice
1994
78-45-7.18. Limitation on a m o u n t of support ordered.
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child
support award that mav be ordered using the base
combined child support obligation table, using the
low income table, or awarding medical expenses except under Subsection (2)
(2) If amounts under either table as provided in
Section 78-45-7 14 in combination with the award of
medical expenses exceeds 50% of the obligor's adjusted gross income, or by adding the child care costs,
total child support would exceed 50% of the obligor's
adjusted gross income, the presumption under Section 78-45-7 17 is rebutted
1994

78-45-9

78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability.
(1) The district court or administrative agency
may issue an order determining the amount of a parent's liability for medical expenses of a dependent
child when the parent
(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order to
d) share those expenses with the other
parent of the dependent child, or
(n) obtain insurance for medical expenses
but fails to do so, or
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer
under insurance coverage obtained after the
prior court or administrative order was issued
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does
not specify what proportions of the expenses are to be
shared, the district court may determine the amount
of liability as may be reasonable and necessary
(3) This section applies to an order without regard
to when it was issued
1994
78-45-7.20.

Accountability of support provided

to benefit child — Accounting.
(1) The court or administrative agency which issues the initial or modified order for child support
may, upon the petition of the obligor, order prospectively the obligee to furnish an accounting of
amounts provided for the child's benefit to the obligor, including an accounting or receipts
(2) The court or administrative agency may prescribe the frequency and the form of the accounting
which shall include receipts and an accounting
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting
only if current on all child support that has been ordered
1994
78-45-7.21. A w a r d of tax e x e m p t i o n for d e p e n d e n t children.
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent
should be awarded the right to claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax
purposes Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in
wntmg, the court or administrative agency shall
award in any final order the exemption on a case-bycase basis
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the
child, and
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or
administrative agency may not award any exemption
to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not current in his child support obligation, in which case the
court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent
unless the award will result in a tax benefit to that
parent
1994
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support where justice requires
1957
78-45-9. E n f o r c e m e n t of right of support.
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support
against the obligor, and the office may proceed
pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable
statute, either on behalf of the Department of
Human Services or any other department or
agency of this state that provides public assis-

78-45-9.1

tance, as defined by Subsection 62A-ll-303(3), to
enforce the right to recover public assistance, or
on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's
right of support against the obligor.
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced
by the office to enforce payment of the obligor's
support obligation, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the
county of residence of the obligee to represent the
office.
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file
a pleading, or submit a written stipulation to the
court, without complying with Subsection (2Kb),
if the purpose or effect of the action, pleading, or
stipulation is to:
(i) establish paternity;
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation;
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of
payment of support; or
(iv) recover support due or owing.
(b) When taking an action described in Subsection (2)(a), a person must file an affidavit with
the court at the time the action is commenced,
the pleading is filed, or the stipulation submitted
stating whether public assistance has been or is
being provided on behalf of a child who is a subject of the action, pleading, or stipulation. If public assistance has been or is being provided, the
person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a
copy of the pleading or stipulation to the office.
(c) If public assistance has been or is being
provided, that person shall join the office as a
party to t h e action or mail or deliver a written
request to t h e office asking it to join as a party to
the action. A copy of that request, along with
proof of service, shall be filed with the court. The
office shall be represented as provided in Subsection (1Kb).
(3) Neither t h e attorney general nor the-county attorney represents or has a n attorney-client relationship with t h e obligee or the obligor in carrying out
the duties arising under this chapter.
1994
78-45-9.1. R e p e a l e d .

1984

78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee.
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act
in the following manner:
(1) provide forms, approved by the Judicial
Council of Utah, for an order of wage assignment
if the obligee is not represented by legal counsel;
(2) the county attorney's office may charge a
fee not to exceed $25 for providing assistance to
an obligee under Subsection (1).
(3) inform the obligee of the right to file impecuniously if the obligee is unable to bear the expenses of the action and assist the obligee with
such filing;
(4) advise the obligee of the available methods
for service of process; and
(5) assist t h e obligee in expeditiously scheduling a h e a r i n g before the court.
1983
78-45-10. A p p e a l s .
Appeals may be t a k e n from orders and judgments
under this act as in other civil actions.
1957
78-45-11.
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H u s b a n d and wife privileged commu-

nication inapplicable — Competency
of spouses.
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of
communications between husband and wife are inap-

plicable under this act. Spouses are competent witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including
marriage and parentage.
1957
78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those presently existing.
The rights herein created are in addition to and not
in substitution to any other rights.
1957
78-45-13. Interpretation a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n .
This act shall be so interpreted a n d construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to m a k e uniform the
law of those states which enact it.
1957
CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-l.
78-45a-2.
78-45a-3.
78-45a-4.
78-45a-5.
78-45a-6.
78-45a-6.5.
78-45a-7.
78-45a-8.
78-45a-9.
78-45a-10.
78-45a-10.5.
78-45a-ll.
78-45a-12.
78-45a-13.
78-45a-14.
78-45a-15.
78-45a-16.
78-45a-17.

Obligations of the father.
Determination of paternity — Effect
— Enforcement.
Limitation on recovery from the father.
Limitations on recovery from father's
estate.
Remedies.
Time of trial.
Paternity action — Jury trial.
Authority for genetic testing.
Selection of experts.
Compensation of expert witnesses.
Effect of genetic test results.
Visitation rights of father.
Judgment.
Security.
Settlement agreements.
Venue.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Short title.
Operation of act.

78-45a-l. Obligations of the father.
The father of a child that is or may be born outside
of marriage is liable to the same extent as the father
of a child bom within marriage, whether or not the
child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary support, and any funeral expenses
for the child. For purposes of child support collection,
a child born outside of marriage includes a child born
to a married woman by a man other than her husband if that paternity has been established.
1990
78-45a-2. Determination of paternity — Effect —
Enforcement.
(1) Paternity may be determined upon:
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative
father, or the public authority chargeable by law
with the support of the child; or
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with Chapter 45e, Voluntary
Declaration of Paternity Act.
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been
acknowledged according to the laws of this state or
any other state, the liabilities of the father may be
enforced in the same or other proceedings by:
(a) the mother, child, or the public authority
that has furnished or may furnish the reasonable
expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education,
necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(b) other persons including private agencies to
the extent that they have furnished the reason-
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WILKINS, Judge:
We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are
adequately presented in the brief and record and the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah
R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
Appellant Selva McGinty seeks reversal of the trial court's
determination that the ranch property acquired by the parties
constituted a marital asset, or even if so, that the distribution
of the asset should have been other than equal. To do so,
appellant challenges the findings of fact entered by the trial
court.
Appellant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the
evidence which supports the trial court's findings and then
demonstrating that despite such evidence the findings are
nevertheless so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence and therefore clearly erroneous. Haaan v.
Haaan. 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991). We affirm the trial
court's judgment.
Appellee Lee McGinty seeks an award of attorney fees and
costs incurred on appeal under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Rule 33(a) provides that if an appeal is

"either frivolous or for delay, [the court] shall award^just
damages, which may include single or double costs . . . and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney."
A frivolous appeal is one that is "not grounded in
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R.
App. P. 33(b). Further, a frivolous appeal "is one in which no
justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily
recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect
that it can ever succeed." Schoney v. Memoria, Estates, Inc..
863 P.2d 59, 63 (Utah App. 1993). Such is not uhe case here,
"[a]lthough bordering perilously close to being frivolous." Call
v. Citv of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Utah App. 1990).
However, an appeal is for delay when "interposed for any
improper purpose such as to . . . gain time that will benefit
only the party filing the appeal." Utah R. App. P. 33(b).
Appellee has raised such a charge in her brief. In reply,
appellant has elected to address only the question of whether or
not his appeal is frivolous, and has left unanswered the claim
that this appeal is interposed for the improper purpose of
gaining time that benefits only himself. When considered in
light of the findings of the trial court relating to appellant's
intentional violation of the trial court's restraining order
regarding the ranch property, and the dealings of appellant with
the title to the ranch property, it becomes evident that the
appeal here has been brought "for delay." The superficial nature
of appellant's initial brief supports this conclusion.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, and hold that
appellee is entitled to attorney fees and double costs incurred
on appeal under Rule 33. We remand to the trial court for the
sole purpose of determining the amount of attorney fees and
double costs incurred by appellee on appeal. We leave to the
sound discretion of the trial court the determination of whether
the attorney fees and double costs are to be paid by appellant,
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appellants attorney, or both, and if both, then in what
proportions.

ff±enaei~T. wiiKlns r~3vaq&
WE CONCUR:
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